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Abstract
In this study we examine the impact of internet use on the duration of non-sequential
search in the housing market. We develop a model of partial equilibrium in the hous-
ing market which suggests an ambiguous eﬀect on the search duration when internet
resources are employed in the search. In this model, the impact of using the internet
can be viewed as increasing the search eﬃciency, or as altering the distribution of
potential matches from which the home buyer can choose. We use data from the
2000 Home Buyer and Seller Survey collected by the National Association of Real-
tors. While theory suggests there might be an increase or a decrease in search times
when using on-line resources in the search, in this data we ﬁnd a tendency for internet
use to increase the duration of home search relative to employing more conventional
search methods.
We use a simultaneous equations approach for the analysis of the impact of internet
listing on the duration until sale in the residential housing market. In this model, the
time on the market and the selling price are jointly determined, once asking price and
the method used for the listing of the property is chosen by the home seller or agent.
We use data from the 2000 Home Buyer and Seller Survey collected by the National
Association of Realtors. We ﬁnd that using the internet to list a house increases
its time on the market. The results presented here are consistent our with previous
ﬁndings pertaining to the use of the internet and the duration of search until a buyer
locates a home to purchase. These results, together with the ﬁndings of the present
study show evidence for a model of the housing market where all buyers are sellers.
We investigate the diﬀerential propensity of voters in the US to participate in
national only versus national and local elections. We use data from the 1987 US
General Social Survey to asses the importance of demographic and local community
attachment characteristics of voters for this diﬀerential voting decision. We ﬁnd that
local community attachment and civic duty play an important role for this voting
decision while personal monetary gains and redistributions do not appear to factor
into the decision. In particular, education, age of respondent and length lived in
community act to lower the costs of voting locally, and inﬂuence the voters’ decision to
3
participate in local elections as well as in national ones. However, economic incentives
such as real estate capital values, local taxes and Social Security allocations do not
appear to drive the diﬀerential voting decision for participating in local and national
elections versus participating in national level elections only.
Thesis Supervisor: William Wheaton
Title: Professor, Urban Economics
Thesis Supervisor: James Snyder
Title: Professor, Political Economy, American Politics, Formal Political Theory
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Chapter 1
Home Buyer Search Duration and
the Internet
1.1 Introduction
The internet, what we today accept as the initial implementation of a shared body
of information, available at the ﬁngertips of those equipped with a computer and an
internet connection, has been around since 1979. The inﬂuence of the internet has
increased tremendously since then and has become a valuable, if not an essential com-
ponent of life in the US today. While the exact amount of importance attributable to
the internet may be open for debate, one thing is certain: in recent years the internet
has become an increasingly important tool and source of information for buyers in a
variety of markets. The addition of the internet as a resource for comparison of goods
and services and as a medium for business transactions has prompted researchers
to examine the internet’s impact on traditional markets [9]. This far reaching, and
unprecedented impact is quickly, and justiﬁably so, becoming the focus of an ever
increasing body of of economic research.
The change in the economic landscape brought on by the impact of the internet’s
presence on the way business is conducted has lead to work such as Brown and
Goolsbee [1]. In their study, the authors investigate the presence of internet markets
as they relate to sequential search in the insurance market. As a counterpart to their
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line of investigation we ask the question about the relationship between the internet
and markets where consumers choose oﬀers in a non-sequential fashion.
In this study we examine the impact of on-line resources for the non-sequential
search in the housing market. The housing market is a natural choice for this inves-
tigation as it is one of the largest markets in the US where the search occurs in a
non-sequential manner. A home buyer seeking to purchase a home must decide, as of-
fers arrive, whether to take the current oﬀer or leave it expecting a subsequent, better
match to arrive. In the latter case, the previous oﬀer cannot be held on to, while the
home buyer keeps looking for a better match, which gives rise to the non-sequential
nature of the search in the housing market.
Brown and Goolsbee [1] concentrate their work on the impact of the internet on
insurance prices. In our study we do not examine any impact of the on-line search on
housing prices as there is not a meaningful way of controlling for the match quality
in our data, as prices in this market vary greatly with the existing house amenities
and exact location. Instead, we focus on the impact of on-line search on home buying
duration. In particular, in this study we ask the question: does the use of internet
resources in home search generally increase or decrease the time it takes to ﬁnd a
house to purchase.
In our empirical analysis of the relationship between home search durations and
the use of the internet in search for a new home, we use data from the 2000 Home
Buyer and Seller Survey conducted by the National Association of Realtors (NAR).
The survey includes data on duration of home search, various ways of using the inter-
net as part of the search and some demographic characteristics of the home buyers.
As a ﬁrst step in this analysis, we employ a hazard model regression to distinguish the
eﬀect of the internet on the duration of home search. In addition, we use an instru-
mental variables technique to control for a particular endogeneity which may exist
in this data. Because of the non-linear nature of the estimation methods employed
in combination with the instrumental variables technique in our setup, there could
be bias in the results which is impossible to eliminate. The proportional hazards
model we employ provides a framework in which the instrumental variables technique
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required here can be easily implemented. It is therefore a useful ﬁrst estimation
approach in this study. However, the (Cox) proportional hazards model places un-
necessary restrictions on the changes the distribution of search times undergoes as a
result of home buyers using the internet. Therefore, we further estimate the eﬀects
of on-line resources using a diﬀerent, quantile regression approach. Of course, the
use of an instrumental variables technique is still warranted in the quantile regression
setting. In a recent work, V. Chernozhukov and C. Hansen [4] deﬁne a technique for
the use of an instrumental variable in quantile regressions, which we employ in this
study.
Since the survey data we use in this study only includes information about people
involved in home search and their particular level of internet use for the purposes of
this search, we are concerned about individual heterogeneity which may be driving
internet use and inﬂuencing the speed with which individuals in our data locate a
home. In particular we are concerned that it is possible that only home searchers
with a large amount of time on their hands go on-line as part of their home search, or
perhaps alternatively, that only those in a hurry to purchase a home and move quickly
employ internet resources in their search. In order to control for this endogeneity we
use a simulated instrument for internet use. Data from the 2000 Current Population
Survey (CPS) Supplement on Computer Ownership and Internet Use, conducted by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics and The US Census Bureau, was used to construct a
predicted internet use level by computing the mean internet use in the CPS sample in
each age and income group available in the main Home Buyer and Seller Survey data.
Other similar mean levels of internet use such as those constructed by age, income
and the metropolitan status of the previous home location were also considered.
Search models dictate that the ability to use on-line resource in addition to tradi-
tional methods of search reduces the cost of search as it takes less time and money to
learn about the choices oﬀered, their location and features. Building on the standard
models of non-sequential search [11, 10] found in the literature, we develop a simple
model of non-sequential search in the housing market. In this model, rather than
changing the costs of search, using the internet as part of the search eﬀort acts to
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increase the arrival rate of oﬀers or to increase the number of available choices to
the home buyer as it brings a wider selection of houses to be viewed, bid on, and
ultimately purchased. Our model suggests that the use of internet resources as part
of the search process in this market has an ambiguous eﬀect on the duration of search.
After instrumenting for internet use as mentioned above, the data from this NAR sur-
vey used here suggests that search durations are likely to be longer when employing
the internet as part of the home search.
1.2 Theoretical Discussion
Theoretical developments in the literature pertinent to this study includeWheaton’s [11]
model of general equilibrium in the housing market and Pissarides’s [10] unemploy-
ment equilibrium model adapted to the housing market situation. Wheaton’s model
is the more simple and straight forward model of the workings of the the housing
market, as it treats the turnover rate, the rate at which households become dissat-
isﬁed with their current housing choice and consequently search for a new home, as
exogenously determined 1. Pissarides, on the other hand, incorporates the turnover
rate into his model and treats it as endogenous.
1.2.1 Simple Model of Non-Sequential Search
There are H households and a ﬁxed housing stock with N units in the market. We
assume there are enough units to house all the households and there is a vacancy
rate V , as some of the units are not occupied. There are three states in which these
households can be located. Matched (M) in which the household is satisﬁed with its
current housing choice and is not looking for a home to buy and move to. A matched
household can become mismatched (S) and search for a new home until it ﬁnds
a suitable match, at which point the household buys the second home and becomes
matched but owning two homes (D). When the previous home of a household in state
1The model presented here is a revision of Wheaton’s model of matching in the housing market
as outlined in [11].
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D is sold, the household returns to state M . Thus, the total number of households is
simply the sum of households located in each state, H = HM +HS+HD. Households
experience a (yearly) match shock probability of β which changes a household in the
matched state into a household which is mismatched, and corresponds to a transition
rate from a matched to a mismatched state. The magnitude of this shock is α. The
number of households owning two houses is simply the number of units multiplied by
the vacancy rate. HD = V N . We assume perfect credit markets.
There is a match probability function F (X). It corresponds to the quality of oﬀers
a mismatched household considers as part of the search. If we assume that the quality
of oﬀers a household looks at during the search is a normally distributed random
variable X with mean µ and variance σ, then F (X) is the cumulative distribution
function of the above normal. Households have a reservation level R, below which the
household would not accept a given oﬀer. The magnitude of the transition shock α
moves the household from utility level UM = U(R) to US = U(R−α) where U(.) is a
suitable utility function. While the reservation utility is endogenous to the model, the
utility level of a mismatched state is predetermined and does not adjust endogenously,
hence the partial equilibrium nature of the model.
Equating the ﬂows in and out of search, in equilibrium we get
HMβ = λ(1− F (R))HS,
so that the fraction of matched households who experience the transition into mis-
matched state, that is the ﬂow into search, equals the accept rate of oﬀers (1−F (R))
multiplied by λ, the search eﬃciency and HS the number of searching households.
Another equivalent interpretation of λ is the arrival rate of oﬀers per given period of
time. In this model we will decompose the arrival rate of oﬀers into a baseline arrival
rate due to search by conventional methods and an arrival rate due to the use of the
internet in searching for a suitable match 2, λ = li.
2Whether the internet eﬀect i is modeled as a multiplicative or an additive eﬀect to the baseline
arrival rate of oﬀers does not change the results of the model in an important way.
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Let
q = λ(1− F (R))
so that q is the probability of ﬁnding a suitable housing unit in a unit of time and 1/q
is the duration of search. In the data used in the empirical estimation of the eﬀect
of the internet on housing market search, we observe a search duration equivalent to
1/q in this model. Let
z =
λ(1− F (R))HS
V
be the probability of sale.
The present discounted value of being in each of the three states, is governed by
the standard 3 ﬂow equations:
rVM = UM − β(VM − VS),
rVS = US + q(VD − VS − P ),
rVD = UM + z(VM − VD + P )
Here, VM , VS and VD are the present values of each state, UM and US are the utility
ﬂows of being matched and mismatched, respectively, P is the market price of a
matched house, and r is the discount rate. The above equations together with the
condition that VD−VS−P = VM −VD+P allow us to solve for the the price and the
present values of being in each state in terms of the utility ﬂows and the parameters
of the model. Thus,
P =
(UM − US)(2β + r + z)
r(2β + 2r + q)
, VM =
(2r + q)UM + 2βUS
r(2β + 2r + q)
VD =
(2β + 2r + q + z)UM − zUS
r(2β + 2r + q)
, and VS =
qUM + 2(β + r)US
r(2β + 2r + q)
.
3While a richer model of search in the housing market (see [11]) needs to include the probability of
(demographic) transition back to a matched state from a mismatched state, trivially ending search,
here adding such a term to the rVS equation does not meaningfully alter the results and has been
omitted for computational simplicity.
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Each household chooses R to maximize the value of being mismatched. After
recalling the deﬁnition of q as a function of R and imposing a functional form for the
utility of a matched state as a function of the reservation R as well, together with
values for the parameters of the model, we can numerically solve for the maximum
value of being in a mismatched state. This maximum occurs at R, the value of R
corresponding to the peek of the value of being mismatched.
For example, with UM =
√
R, match quality distributed N(75, 10), a discount
rate of 5%, transition rate β of 10%, search eﬃciency of 50%, and US = 5, we obtain
R = 68.1624 as shown in Figure 1-1 a). For the above parameter values the value of
being mismatched achieves a well deﬁned, unique maximum at R. However, when
the magnitude of the transition shock is small, so the drop in utility from a matched
to a mismatched state is small, the home buyer is indiﬀerent between housing choices
above a certain level (see part b) of the ﬁgure).
With a small drop in utility, the cost of remaining mismatched is not suﬃcient to
cause the household to search and move to a new home. Rather, the household will
hold out indeﬁnitely for the perfect match. This situation is equivalent in this model’s
framework to an inﬁnitesimally small accept rate of oﬀers. When the probability of
ﬁnding a suitable new match in a given period of time, q, is 0, the value of being
mismatched reduces to VS =
US
r
. In all further discussion we will assume that the
drop in utility is large enough, so that being mismatched is bad enough to require
an adjustment of the reservation level to a new, well deﬁned R. In either case, for
suﬃciently large R, F (R) is 1, and VS levels out to
US
r
. In order to have a well deﬁned,
unique maximum for VS, we need VS evaluated at R
 to exceed US
r
. This condition
reduces to U(R) > US.
1.2.2 Internet Use in the Framework of the Model
The use of on-line resources as part of the search in the housing market enters into
this model through two separate channels. First, using the internet as part of the
search could simply speed up the arrival of oﬀers, so that one can view the set of
available choices in a shorter amount of time, or view a larger number of oﬀers in
21
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(a) Well deﬁned R, with large drop
in utility when mismatched.
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(b) VS levels out at USr for a small
drop in utility when mismatched be-
fore reaching a maximum.
Figure 1-1: Plot of VS (y-axis) vs. R (x-axis)
any given time period. Speeding up the arrival of oﬀers, internet use enters into
our model through the parameter λ. However, looking at potential housing choices
on-line carries more information than simply delivering these choices faster. If using
the internet in the search delivers a larger set of options, the actual distribution
of match qualities might be aﬀected. The additional information about each house
available on-line allows the home buyer to rule out unsuitable choices more easily and
concentrate the search eﬀorts only on highly suitable choices. Rather than having
to spend time and resources driving out to each potential house location to visit,
the home buyer is able to substitute visiting the house with viewing it over the
internet. Both the mean and the variance of the distribution of seriously considered
choices would increase when the internet is used in the search as a substitute for
actual visiting of some houses. A larger variety of choices in terms of the match
quality can be viewed on-line, increasing the variance of the distribution of choices.
In addition, one could choose to visit houses that are much better matches than he
or she would have visited had the search been conducted through traditional search
methods. Dismissing choices after viewing them on-line that would have been ruled
out only after visiting when searching through traditional methods increases the mean
of the distribution of potential housing matches. Thus, a second way in which the
internet aﬀects search is through increasing the mean and/or the variance of the
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distribution of choices.
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Figure 1-2: Sensitivity of R to model parameters
Consider the eﬀect of a change in the parameters of the model on the change in R.
The optimum reservation can be written as an implicit function of the parameters,
β, r, l, i, µ, σ and US as a solution to the equation
dVS
dR
= 0. We verify that in
fact d
2VS
dR2
< 0 here, and decompose λ = li to distinguish a internet speciﬁc increase
in arrival rate. The optimum reservation value decreases with an increase in the
transition rate. The more likely a household is to experience the adverse mismatching
shock, the less the household holds out for a better match, and thus the lower the
optimum reservation. Likewise, with a higher interest rate, the optimum reservation
drops, as is to be expected. An increase in λ, and more speciﬁcally an increase in
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the internet portion, i, leads to an increase in R. Similarly, the optimum reservation
level increases with an increase in µ, σ and US. For example, using parameter values
as those in the numerical example used above, we see that ﬁxing all but one parameter
at a time produces a change in R as shown in Figure 1-2.
How does an increase in internet use during the search aﬀect the duration of
search? First, let’s examine the search eﬃciency eﬀect. Since ∂i
∂R
> 0, when i
increases R adjusts up as well. Recall the deﬁnition of the probability of ﬁnding
a suitable match in a given time period, q = (li)(1 − F (R)). The ﬁrst term, li,
increases with i, but the second term decreases since R adjusts up in response to a
higher internet use. The overall eﬀect on q and therefore on the duration of search
1
q
is at least ambiguous. However, looking at the numerical example above, while i
doubles, R increases from about 67 to 71, which translates to an increase of about
0.13 in terms of the CDF of N(75, 10). Thus, the overall eﬀect on q is positive, the
eﬀect on 1
q
is negative, and the increase in internet use, when the internet acts through
the search eﬃciency, should result in a decrease in search times. With this reasonable
choice of parameters it is then plausible to conclude that if the internet only acts to
increase the arrival rate of oﬀers, search duration is likely to decrease as a result of
increased internet use in the housing market search. In the current model any costs
associated with search, in terms for example of eﬀort exerted by the potential home
buyer in the process enter through this search eﬃciency parameter.
An increase in the arrival rate of oﬀers is not the only possible channel through
which employing the internet in the search process can aﬀect the duration of search.
As discussed by T. Malone and his co-authors in [8], as a larger amount of informa-
tion becomes readily available to the to the buyer through the internet, the structure
of the market undergoes a fundamental change. In their work, Malone at. al., do
acknowledge the increase of the arrival rate of oﬀers when using the internet through
that they call an electronic communication eﬀect. It increases the amount of infor-
mation that can be exchanged between parties in a given amount of time and acts
to decrease the costs associated with, in our case, search. This corresponds to the
parameter λ in our model.
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A diﬀerent eﬀect of the internet discussed in their work is what they have termed
a brokerage eﬀect. The internet serves to create an electronic market that “allow[s] a
buyer to screen out obviously inappropriate suppliers and to compare the the oﬀerings
of many diﬀerent suppliers”. 4 In the setup of search in the housing market, this eﬀect
can be interpreted as the internet acting as a ﬁltering mechanism for oﬀers. Since
home buyers are able to input speciﬁc characteristics or ranges of features they desire
in a home, using the internet can quickly and easily personalize the range of oﬀers
available to suit each home buyer. In addition, with the availability of virtual tours,
and multiple angle views of the house oﬀers available on the internet, home buyers
can immediately rule out choices that they would have at least driven by to look at
when searching through conventional methods.
Thus, for any amount of time spent in search, using the internet provides the home
buyer with a set of oﬀers that are better suited to the individual home buyer than
conventional search methods could provide. This eﬀect translates in our model to a
higher mean, µ, in the distribution of oﬀers available to each home buyer. In addition,
by increasing the number of suppliers the internet acts to increase the overall variety
of oﬀers available and thus increase the spread, σ of the distribution of oﬀers available
when using the internet in the search.
If the internet acts to change the distribution of the available choices by increasing
the mean of the choices or by increasing the variance of the available houses to consider
during the search, without increasing the arrival rate of oﬀers, this model predicts an
increase of search duration. The logic here is straight forward: when µ or σ increase,
F(R) increases, and with the absence of change in other parameters, this leads to a
decrease in q, and an increase in 1
q
. The search duration unambiguously increases.
It reality, it is likely to expect that the role of the internet is a combination of an
arrival rate increase and a shift/spread of the distribution of the potential matches’
quality. Whether one eﬀect or the other dominates, is impossible to distinguish
through theory. Thus, the remaining of this study focuses on the empirical eﬀect of
internet use on search durations. By empirically determining whether the increase in
4See [8], p. 488.
25
internet use leads to shorter or longer search times, we can then distinguish whether
the internet mostly functions to increase the arrival rate of oﬀers, or to mostly change
the underlying distribution of oﬀer qualities available to a home buyer in the housing
market.
1.3 Estimation Strategy
The dependent variable in in this study is a continuous variable representing the
number of weeks a home buyer spent actively searching until ﬁnding a home which is
eventually purchased by this home buyer. We regress the logarithm of this duration
on a dichotomous measure of internet use while searching for a home and a number
of demographic and geographic controls. These variables come from the NAR survey
data used in this study. Unfortunately, the above may not be enough to correctly
identify the eﬀect of the internet use on the duration of home buying. There is
a potentially serious endogeneity of internet use inﬂuencing the duration of home
search. If individual home buyer heterogeneity exists, in terms, for example of how
picky the home buyer is,how quality concerned or prone to lengthy search, which on
one hand is correlated with internet use while buying a house, and on the other hand
aﬀects the duration of the search, the results would be biased.
In order to correct this potential endogeneity in the system, a technique of in-
strumental variables is warranted. The NAR Survey data itself does not contain any
potential instruments for internet use. However, through the use of an auxiliary sam-
ple, in the form of the CPS Supplement on Internet Use and Computer Ownership, we
can construct a simulated instrument for internet use in our main sample. From the
CPS data we construct mean internet use in the CPS sample, which is representative
of the US population at large by demographic categories such as age, and income.
We then match this predicted internet use to the corresponding demographic cell in
the NAR Survey main sample.
It is reasonable to expect that internet use varies by age and income level, with
younger and higher income households having a higher degree of internet use since
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to a great extent income proxies for educational attainment. A variable describing
the level of education is not part of the NAR Survey. Both because home internet
access is costly and because education and age can discern individuals who are part
of the information age generation, income and age may play an important role in
deciding to use the internet as a tool for gathering information. We expect that
internet use varies with income and age. On the other hand we ﬁnd it reasonable
to conclude that income – age categories are uncorrelated with the speed with which
households ﬁnd a suitable housing match. Therefore we use the means by income–
age categories of general internet use as an instrument for internet use when buying
a home in our NAR Survey data sample. Other demographic characteristics such as
the number of children and the level of urbanization of the previous neighborhood are
also reasonably uncorrelated with the home search duration, yet inﬂuence the level
of internet use as part of the search. Urban and to some extent suburban areas have
higher home internet access than rural areas, as internet providers oﬀer more local
dial-up services and high speed connections in cities. The presence of children in the
household may also inﬂuence the decision to have internet access at home: new parents
may ﬁnd information and parenting help on-line, and parents decide to provide their
school aged children with access to new technology and internet resources as part of
enhancing their children’s education. Using combinations of these demographic and
geographic characteristics we devise a instrument for internet use which is more ﬁnely
matched to a particular demographic and geographic group of home buyers.
The geographical location of the home to be purchased as well as the location of the
previous address, from which the search would be conducted is available at the state
level. Thus there are two relevant state variables for each observation: the previous
state and the new one. In our analysis, we need to control for the previous state in
order to remove any possible diﬀerences of internet availability that might exist across
states. It is possible that highly urbanized states such as California, where information
technology businesses and internet savvy individuals are clustered, might have higher
internet use rates than rural states, such as some of the states located in the Midwest,
where the internet connectivity, which is somewhat less important for agriculture, lags
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behind. We likewise need to control for the particular new state to which a household
id moving to in order to account for diﬀerent economic conditions across states. This
requires a large number of state indicator variables to be included in out regressions.
This large number of controls to be included as right hand side variables makes the
analysis impractical. We restrict our investigation to those households in the NAR
Survey sample which moved within state. Only 15% of the households in our data
moved across state borders from their previous home to a new one. State areas are
large enough that internet use reduces the cost of search whether a household moves
within the state or to a diﬀerent one. We assume that whether the move is within
the state or out of state is exogenous to the model and proceed with an estimation of
the eﬀect of internet use on the duration of home search for within state movers only.
This restriction of the data used allows us to reduce the number of state indicators
to be included in our regressions, as now there is simply a state that needs to be
controlled for.
A simple estimation strategy that could be employed, would consist of a probit
model, regressing internet use when buying a home on the predicted internet use de-
rived from the CPS and a matrix of demographic characteristics as a ﬁrst stage and
then using the predicted values from this ﬁrst stage in the second stage Cox model
regression. A bootstrapping [6] technique is then needed to obtain unbiased standard
errors in the second stage regression. There are, however, two major problems associ-
ated with this technique. The ﬁrst is a possible source of bias in the results due to the
non-linear nature of the probit model used as a ﬁrst stage. Because of the non-linear
nature of the regression in the second stage Cox model, in a combination with the
probit ﬁrst stage as an instrumental variable technique, the bias in the results would
be impossible to eliminate in this estimation framework. A linear probability model
rather than the probit model ﬁrst stage regression would eliminate the problem, how-
ever, since the split of internet users versus non-internet users in our sample is 30%
to 70%, the linear probability model produces results that are quite diﬀerent than
the probit estimates and is therefore not quite appropriate here.
A diﬀerent shortcoming of the proportional hazards estimation comes in through
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the restriction placed on the underlying distribution of search durations in this model.
The Cox model assumes the internet eﬀect produces a simple locational shift in the
distribution of search times. This assumption is not likely to hold here: it is unlikely
that the internet would act to shift each search time by the exact same ﬁxed amount.
It is more likely that using the internet in the home search results in a bigger impact
on the search duration at some lengths of search and a smaller, or perhaps even the
opposite eﬀect at diﬀerent points in the distribution of search times. To allow of a
more general change in this distribution, a diﬀerent estimation model is appropriate
here.
1.3.1 A Quantile Regression Approach
A quantile regression estimates a conditional quantile function. The idea behind this
technique is analogous to the traditional ordinary least squares regression where one
solves
min
µ∈
i=1∑
n
(yi − µ(xi, β))2
as an estimate of the conditional sample mean, E(Y |x). The quantile regression
obtains an estimate of the conditional sample median by minimizing the sum of
absolute values of the residuals. This minimization problem can be generalized to
estimate conditional quantiles other than the median. That is, solve
min
µ∈
i=1∑
n
ρτ (yi − ξ(xi, β)),
where ρτ is the absolute value function for τ = .5 and is a “tilted absolute value”
function for other values of the quantile index τ ∈ (0, 1) as illustrated in [7]. The
more general ρτ allows estimation of conditional quantiles other than the median
and generalizes the median regression to a quantile regression for any quantile index
τ . This technique of estimating a conditional quantile function is diﬀerent than
subsetting the sample and estimating each section of the unconditional distribution,
as such truncation on the dependent variable would yield incorrect results. Again
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see [7]. Here, all observations are used in determining the regression ﬁtting of each
quantile.
A quantile regression approach allows for a greater ﬂexibility in the underlying
distribution of search durations as they get aﬀected by internet use. By performing
a median rather than a mean regression and then for each quintile, decile, or in
general terms for each quantile of observations in the data we can map out the eﬀect
of the internet for each portion of the search duration distribution. An instrument
variable technique may still be warranted in the quantile regression analysis setting
to correct for any individual heterogeneity present when one uses the internet in
the home search. We present ordinary quantile regression results and then employ
an instrumented quantile regression technique as outlined in a recent work by V.
Chernozhukov and C. Hansen, [4].
Following their work, let search duration outcome be denoted Yd = qd(X,Ud) in
the two states of the world with d ∈ {0, 1} where d is an indicator for internet use
as part of the search, X is a vector of observable covariates, and Ud is unobservable
individual heterogeneity such as quality concern or pickiness when choosing a house.
The individual decision to use the internet (or not) in the search is in general
D = 1(ϕ(Z,X, V ) ≥ 0)
so the unobserved vector V could depend on unobservables such as the pickiness Ud
producing endogeneity in the model.
This model requires the assumption that conditional on (Z,X, V ), U0 nd U1 are
equal in distribution, that is, that people decide to use the internet (or not) in their
search without knowing how picky they are in their housing choice relative to other,
observationally the same home buyers. This is less restrictive that the usual as-
sumption of identical U0 and U1. Another relevant relaxation of a usual assumption
aﬀorded by this model is that it allows for an arbitrary correlation between the in-
strument Z, and the error V . Such a correlation is absolutely not allowed in other
settings such as 2SLS. However, as our instrument for internet use when buying a
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home is a measure of predicted general internet use, that is mean internet use in each
home buyer’s demographic group as deﬁned by age group, income category, number
of children, race, state of residence and so on, and it is very likely to expect that Z
in this analysis is correlated with the error.
V. Chernozhukov and C. Hansen, [4] devise an Inverse Quantile Regression (IQR)
estimator that accounts for quantile treatment eﬀects by solving the following prob-
lem5: ﬁnd a function q(x, d, τ) such that 0 is the solution to the quantile regression
problem, in which one regresses Y − q(x, d, τ) on some function of (X, Z).
In the style of the Inverse Quantile Regression, we estimate the log-linear model
Qln(Yd)|X(τ) = dατ +X
′βτ ,
where d indicates a dichotomous “treatment” status of internet use in the home search,
the outcomes Yd is duration of search, and X is a matrix of covariates including
variables such as age categories, income ranges, race indicators, and distance of the
move. The coeﬃcient α has the interpretation of an elasticity of search duration
with respect to internet use, and is the causal treatment eﬀect of internet use on the
duration of search. The coeﬃcient on internet use in the standard quantile regressions
(QR) has a diﬀerent interpretation. It estimates the statistical eﬀect of internet use
on the duration of search through conditional quantiles. Therefore, the comparison
between the QR and the IQR results is analogous for example to a comparison between
results from OLS and 2SLS models.
1.4 Data
The National Association of Realtors conducts surveys on a regular basis of home
buyers and home sellers in order to gather information about their home buying or
selling experience and to assess the role of real estate professionals in these transac-
tions. At the beginning of the year 2000, the NAR mailed a questionnaire to 20,000
5See [4] p. 10
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consumers who purchased or sold a home in 1999. The address database was ulti-
mately derived from courthouse records of recent home buyers in the United States.
This survey resulted in 1,778 usable observations. The 2000 NAR Survey is of partic-
ular interest to this study as it used the ﬁrst NAR questionnaire to include detailed
questions about the home buyers use of the internet from the onset of the search to
the actual purchase. [5]
From this NAR Survey we use 1,746 observations which include information on
home buying (as opposed to home selling). The weeks of home search variable used
in this study comes from answers to the question: How long did you actively search
before you located the home you recently purchased? This response provided a num-
ber of weeks and was used as a continuous duration of search variable. While the
2000 NAR Home buyer and Seller Survey asks whether the internet was used as a
source of information in the home search, we consider that answer not to be highly
relevant to the degree of internet use while locating a home to be purchased. While
37% of the survey respondents indicated that they used the internet as an information
source, there is no indication here about whether the internet was used speciﬁcally as
a source for locating homes. We use answers to the question: What actions have you
taken as a result of accessing real estate information from the internet? that include
making an oﬀer on a home found on-line, visiting a home found on-line or purchasing
a home found on line as the relevant internet use in home buying durations. Using
this information we created a dichotomous zero - one internet use variable that takes
on a value of one when any of the above actions were taken by the home buyer in the
home search. Our deﬁnition of internet use ensures that the those indicating internet
use in the home search are serious about ﬁnding a new home and not simply casual
lookers at houses with little intent of an actual purchase6.
The demographic characteristics of the home buyers in this survey include age,
income, race, Hispanic ethnicity, number of children, household composition, number
of earners, and primary language spoken. This demographic information in the data
6The results calculated using the less restrictive measure of internet use as answer to the question:
Was the internet used as an information source in the home search? produced no signiﬁcant eﬀect
on duration of search.
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is by no means extensive; highest level of education completed would have been very
useful in this study but is unfortunately unavailable. The geographic information in
the data available includes state where the previous home is located, and the home
search is most likely conducted from this state, and the metropolitan, suburban or
rural nature of the previous home. These geographic characteristics are also available
with relation to the consequently purchased home.
In order to correct for the possible endogeneity between internet use and home
buyers in our main data we use age and income category means in a more general
sample of US residents as an instrument for internet use. In order to construct this
simulated instrument we use data from the Current Population Survey, Internet and
Computer Use Supplement. The CPS is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households
conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The
questionnaires are conducted either by telephone, or by an interviewer who visits the
sample unit. The sample provides estimates for the nation as a whole and includes
a number of diﬀerent topical supplements each month. The Internet and Computer
Use Supplement questionnaire has been conducted in December 1998 and again in
August 2000. 7 Computer Ownership data exists for years before 1998, but collection
of internet use data in the CPS starts in 1998.
We use answers to the questions: Did the respondent use the internet in the home?
and: Did the respondent use the internet outside the home? as a measure of internet
use. After creating mean internet usage by age and income categories in the CPS
sample, we generate age, income category, and other demographics, groups in the
main NAR survey sample and merge the internet use means for each age and income,
etc. group to use as a simulated instrument for internet use in our NAR survey data.
The descriptive statistics of the key variables from the NAR survey data are
presented in Table 1.2, ﬁrst for the entire sample and then for within-state movers
7We also calculated our results using the December 1998 CPS sample. There were no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the results when using the December 1998 CPS data in the calculation of the instrument
for internet use. While the overall amount of internet use increased in the interim, this indicates a
proportional shift in internet use by demographic categories used here, and no spatial change in the
type of people using the internet relevant to our study between the two dates when the CPS data
was collected.
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only, which are used in our analysis. In the NAR survey data, 85% of the respondents
moved to a new home in the same state.8 The ages of the respondents are recorded
in 5 years ranges, and the mean age of home buyers is between 35 and 39 years old in
both the full sample and in the within-state movers group. Income is similarly divided
in categories in our data, with the mean income falling between $40,000 and $50,000.
Demographic characteristics available for the respondents and their families include
number of children, race and Hispanic origin indicators, marital status and number of
income earners in the household. The mean number of children in the home buyers’
families is just under two, and again there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the number
of children for within-state versus cross state movers. Over 85% of the sample is White
while only 6% is Black. The prevalent household type includes a married couple, at
63% of the within-state movers group, with single female households following at 19%
and single male households, at 9%. The unmarried couple households account for 7%
of the within-state movers sub-sample.
Of the within-state movers, 22% lived within city neighborhoods before their
move, 19% of the home buyer households’ previous home is in a suburb, and only
5% searched for a new home from rural areas. The CPS sample metropolitan area
inhabitants are 27% of that sample, relatively similar to the percent of home buyers,
searching for a home from within a metropolitan, or city area. The percent of sub-
urban households engaged in home search is much smaller, relative to the percent of
general suburb dwellers. This is to be expected as in the US there is not only a large,
but a growing suburban population. The situation is similar for households searching
for a home from non-urban, rural areas. Only 5% of home buyers search from a rural
area, while the percent of non-metropolitan area dwellers in general, from the CPS
sample, is as high as 28%. These numbers are also not surprising considering the
lower mobility rates in non-urban areas.
Internet use, in terms of the actions taken as a result of using the internet in
8When either the previous or the new state of residence was missing from the data, households
moving within 50 miles of their previous home were assumed to have moved within state. When both
the previous and new state of residence was missing the observation was not used in the analysis.
We expect that those who did not report either state of residence did so at random in this sample.
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the home search, including visiting a home found on-line, making an oﬀer on a home
found on line, or purchasing a home found on-line is at 30% in the entire NAR Survey
sample and 28% among within-state movers. The main reason for making the move
was the the desire to own a home with 34% of the respondents pointing this as a
reason for buying a home, followed by the need for more space, with 18% of the
respondents giving this as a reason for the move, and 12% listing a relocation or a
new job as a reason for the move.
The CPS data used in this study is summarized in the third column of Table 1.2.
Overall internet use at home in the CPS data is at 35%, somewhat higher than internet
use as part of the home search in the NAR Survey sample of home buyers. Those
sampled in the CPS are slightly less aﬄuent, which is to be expected in the general
population relative to those households active in home buying. There is a slightly
higher percent of Hispanic ethnicity observations in the CPS, as well as female-head
households. The male-head households also account for a higher percent of the CPS
sample. It is possible that there are diﬀerences in the manner in which single versus
other household type is reported in the two surveys that accounts for this diﬀerence. It
is also possible that the higher percent of lower income households in the CPS sample
accounts for the presence of more single household heads and Hispanic respondents
in the CPS relative to the households surveyed by the NAR.
The average number of weeks of search for a home is 15 for the entire NAR sample,
and 16 weeks for the within state movers group. Even though all home search in this
data ended with a successful location and purchase of a suitable home, the variation
in the durations of home search is enormous. There is as little as less than a weeks’
time of search in the data until the home, which was eventually purchased my the
home buyer, was found, and up to as much as 465 weeks of search until success. In
the within-state movers sub-sample there are 383 households which used the internet
in the home search and 967 which did not. Among the internet users group, the most
successes in ﬁnding a home occurred at 12 weeks of search, and the height of this
peek in the distribution involves 51 households. The largest number of home buyers
among the non-internet group were successful at only 4 weeks of search, and since
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this is a more numerous group in our data, this peek involves 116 home buyers.
1.5 Results
Figure 1-4 describes the distribution of search times until success in ﬁnding the home
eventually purchased. The distribution of search times for those observations where
the internet was used is in part a) of the ﬁgure, and for those where internet resources
were not used in the home search is in part b). Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests for the
equality of the two distributions reject at the 8% level, and even though the two
distributions appear somewhat similar, we are conﬁdent that there are two distinct
distributions. There is a rather anomalous peak in the distribution of search dura-
tions, both in the case of internet use, and in the case of no internet exactly at 52
weeks of search, and then again at 104 weeks of search. This presents an interesting
point that needs to be addressed here. It is possible that these peaks are due to
misreporting in the NAR data sample. It is rather unusual to suppose that there
is a valid reason such that those who have searched for almost a year should ﬁnd
their match in the housing market at exactly 52 weeks. It is likely that the spikes
in successes of search occurring at precisely 1 year and 2 years of search are due to
observations in the NAR survey where respondents erroneously remembered that it
took them a year to ﬁnd a house and reported search of 52 weeks, while in reality it
may have taken them close to 52 weeks, but not exactly.
Fortunately, this possible misreporting does not present a problem for the quantile
regression analysis performed here, since 52 weeks of search (and also 104 weeks of
search) are located well in the tail of the distribution of search times. In our data,
90% of the respondents ﬁnd a match after 36 weeks of search, and both peaks above
are located past the 90th percentile of search durations. Any misreporting of the
number of weeks as 52, or 104 is likely to reﬂect actual search duration close to the
reported 52 weeks or 104 weeks. Misreporting within the 90th quantile does not aﬀect
the quantile regression results concerning the rest of the distribution of search times.
The question as to whether a simple locational shift of the distribution has oc-
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curred or or whether a more complicated change in the shape results from internet
use in the search, can be addressed through quantile regression analysis as well. If
the coeﬃcients on internet use are the same across all quantiles of search times, then
the change is a pure locational shift. If there is any diﬀerence in the eﬀect of the
internet on the duration of search, then the evidence points to a more complicated
change of search times due to the use of on-line resources in the search, and justiﬁes
the choice of quantile regression analysis over a proportional hazards model. Our
evidence points to the latter and rules out a simple locational shift.
1.5.1 Quantile Regression Model
A proportional hazards model does not allow for a detailed look at the changes in the
distribution of search times as a result of internet use. While the overall eﬀect on this
distribution of search times may be a shift out, we need to use quantile regression
analysis in order to ﬁnd out if the internet has a diﬀerent eﬀect across quantiles. The
median time to ﬁnd a suitable home in our data is 8 weeks, so that 50% of those
searching for a house in our data ﬁnd a suitable match at τ = .5, after 8 weeks. The
ﬁrst quantile, τ = .1 represents in our sample search duration of one week, τ = .2
represents search lasting three weeks, τ = .3 is at 4 weeks, and τ = .4 is at six weeks.
The sixth quantile, τ = .6 represents search of 12 weeks before ﬁnding a suitable
house to purchase, τ = .7 represents search of 14 weeks, τ = .8 is at 22 weeks, and
after 36 weeks of search 90% of our sample have found a suitable match. There is a
considerable right tail in the distribution of search times extending to over 200 weeks
of search9.
The results from the standard quantile regression analysis are graphically repre-
sented in ﬁgure 1-5. Each panel of the ﬁgure tracks the eﬀect of the variable on the
y-axis with the quantile index, represented on the x-axis. Figure 1-3 a) tracks the
impact of internet use when searching for a house on the search outcome in loga-
rithmic terms. This is the direct impact of internet use without accounting for any
9There are 25 observations of search over 104 weeks of search and even one report of searching
for 456 weeks before ﬁnding the house that was then purchased.
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possible endogeneity. While in the low quantiles using the internet acts to prolong
the search duration, in the very last quantile, for those searching for 36 weeks or
more, the use of the internet actually speeds up the time until a suitable match is
found. The results for this last quantile in the right tail of the distribution include
observations of search duration ranging from 36 to 456 weeks of search. As discussed
in [2], there are theoretical reasons why results concerning the outliers in the right tail
of the distribution of search times may be inaccurate and spurious. We will therefore
refrain from relying heavily on results about the 90th quantile of search times in the
present analysis.
The results for most of the distribution of search times in the housing market are
consistent with the notion that the internet changes the type of houses available to
choose from for each home buyer as outlined in the search model presented above: a
higher mean in the distribution of housing choices results in a longer search. When the
choices one searches through are easy to examine in detail, it is feasible to visit each
option and look through it in detail, making sure that more subtle details such as the
direction certain rooms face, the size and relationships between the rooms, closets,
staircases, and the condition of the structure match the home buyer’s preferences.
The internet brings each housing choice closer to every home buyer through virtual
tours. One can examine the details, and choose among a distribution of houses that is
overall better suited to himself or herself over the internet, independent of distance.
In the absence of on-line resources (or their use), if a house is far from the home
buyer, one drives by to make sure that the structure is standing, and if it simply
has the right number of rooms and bathrooms it is considered among the potential
matches.
The results show that the eﬀectiveness of the internet to provide a better distri-
bution of housing matches declines with the duration of search. Thus, at ﬁrst, the
internet acts to provide better housing choices to the home buyer, but as the search
goes on it’s role to provide better suited choices declines. It seems that the home
buyer using the internet slowly learns which houses are the most highly suited to his
or her preferences, and the distribution of choices available to search through does
38
not keep improving indeﬁnitely. This result should not come as a surprise since there
is a limit to the improvement in the mean of the distribution of housing choices the
internet can oﬀer to each individual home buyer, as perhaps the ideal choice for each
home buyer does not even exist in the housing market.
The demographic characteristics such as age income, and race do not vary sig-
niﬁcantly across quantiles and in each quantile in the distribution does not have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the duration of search. Similarly, geographic characteristics such
as the type of neighborhood and state do not aﬀect the search times (diﬀerentially)
across quantiles. The main signiﬁcant eﬀects on duration of search involve the in-
ternet use. These results indicate that by and large the internet acts to improve the
types of choices available to each home buyer by increasing the mean, and also per-
haps by increasing the spread of matches available to view, but this improvement has
a limit, as the mean of the distribution of matches either reaches the perfect match
or stops short for lack of a perfect match for the home owner’s preferences. At longer
durations of search, the internet has a smaller impact on the distribution of choices,
resulting in a smaller increase in search durations when the internet is used relative
to the shorter search durations.
Inference on the quantile regression for the eﬀects on internet use on the distri-
bution of search durations was performed using tests developed by V. Chernozhukov
in [3]. Namely, we are interested in testing for three possibilities.
• the eﬀect of internet use is a pure location shift for most of the distribution,
ατ = α for all quantiles in τ ∈ [.1, .9],
• the eﬀect of internet use aﬀects the location and scale only of the outcome
distribution,
• the eﬀect of using the internet is unambiguously positive, that is testing the
null hypothesis of ατ ≥ 0 for all quantiles in τ ∈ [.1, .9].
The results of the tests of the three hypothesis are presented in table 1.1. The
subsample size10 for the bootstrap technique in the resampling technique used in the
10Smaller size sometimes yielded singular results as some of the dichotomous covariates, such as
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tests was 3000. The most important hypothesis is the ﬁrst one, and it is clearly
rejected. The coeﬃcient on internet use is not constant across quantiles so that the
use of on-line resources has a diﬀerential eﬀect on diﬀerent parts of the distribution
of search times. We cannot reject the hypothesis that only the mean and the scale of
the distribution of are aﬀected as a result of internet use. It is likely that the ﬁrst part
of the distributions shifts out, prolonging the duration of search in the low quantiles,
and the last part of the distribution of search times shifts in, shortening the search
for those that search the longest, together with an increase in the mean time of search
when using the internet. However, the precise form of the change in the distribution
of search times when using the internet is not of particular economic internet, as long
as the change is not constant across quantiles. We cannot reject the hypothesis that
internet use slows down the search in all quantiles (τ ∈ [.1, .9]) quantiles. Speciﬁcally,
even though the results late in the distribution suggest a possible decrease in the
search duration as a result of internet use, the stochastic dominance tests suggests
that this result is likely to be spurious. Therefore, we conclude that the eﬀect of
the internet is to prolong search duration relative to using conventional methods of
search, especially for search duration lasting no more than 36 weeks.
Table 1.1: Tests Results for the Internet Use in Home Search up to 36 Weeks.
Smirnov Critical Value
Hypothesis Null Alternative Statistic (5%) Decision
Pure Location
Shift ατ = α ατ = α 1.67 1.31 Reject
Location-Scale
Shift ατ = α+ γατ ατ = α+ γατ 0.93 1.42 Can’t Reject
Stochastic
Dominance ατ ≥ 0 eτ : ατ < 0 0.48 3.14 Can’t Reject
Note: b=3000, subsampling with replacement. Quantile index, τ ∈ [.1, .9]
1.5.2 Instrumental Quantile Treatment Eﬀects
What about the possible endogeneity of internet use as part of the home search? The
quantile regression analysis, together with an instrument for internet use constructed
some race indicators, attained a value of 1 in very small percent of the observations.
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Figure 1-3: The Eﬀect of Internet Use on the Log of Weeks of Search Across Diﬀerent
Regression Quantiles
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by age, income, number of children, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and type of urban/rural
location, categories is presented in Figure 1-6. The corresponding objective to be
minimized is plotted against α for some of the regression quantiles in ﬁgure 1-7.
Figure 1-3 b) shows the results for the internet use treatment eﬀect on the search
duration outcome (again in terms of log of weeks of search). We control for similar
demographics as in the proportional hazards model and in the un-instrumented ver-
sion of the quantile regression analysis, such as income, age and distance of the move
from the old home to the new one.
The IQR analysis shows that there is an increase in search durations in every
quantile where the results are signiﬁcant. Moreover, in each quantile where the results
are signiﬁcant the coeﬃcient on internet use is higher after instrumenting for a possible
endogeneity of internet use while searching for a house in the model than in the
standard quantile regressions. At the median search duration of 8 weeks, the elasticity
of search in the IQR regression is 1.8, which translates to an increase of search by
about two weeks when the internet is used in the search. This analysis shows that
the internet does have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect for durations of search around the
median of the distribution. So, as the overall eﬀect of the internet is to increase the
search times, the increase in search durations is more pronounced after controlling for
any possible individual heterogeneity. Even without instrumenting, in the standard
quantile regressions we see an increase in the search durations as a result of internet
use. After accounting for a possible endogeneity in the model, the search times
increase even further as a result of internet use in every quantile where the results
are signiﬁcant. Thus, we are conﬁdent that the internet acts to slow search for most
of the distribution of search times in the housing market.
After controlling for individual heterogeneity such as prone to search, picky about
the housing choice or house quality concerns among the home buyers in our data,
internet use slowed the search even more. Thus, we are conﬁdent in the results (from
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the standard quantile regressions) pointing to an increase in search duration when
using the internet. Furthermore, the causal eﬀect of internet use in the housing market
search is that of an increase in search duration around median of the distribution of
search times. The quantiles in both tails of the distribution, indicating very short
and very long search durations, do not exhibit a causal increase of search duration
due to internet use. In these quantiles there is no signiﬁcant bias in the results due
to individual heterogeneity among the home buyers on our sample. However, around
the median of the distribution, the above results show that if a home buyer were
forced to use the internet in the home search the result would be a longer search. The
diﬀerence between the QR and IQR results around median lengths of search shows
that picky or quality concerned home buyers tend to avoid the use of the internet in
their search more than other home buyers do.
The empirical analysis of this data suggests a likely overall increase in search
durations for reasonable lengths of search (lasting between 4 and 14 weeks) when
employing the internet. This allows us to distinguish between two likely hypothesis
about the role of the internet as part of search in the housing market. The above
empirical evidence, together with the theoretical model developed here, suggest that
the internet plays a role in the search that goes beyond a change in the arrival rate of
oﬀers. Given the results above, we can conclude that the internet carries additional
information about the potential housing choices available, and not just adds to the
volume of choices the home buyer can have access to in a given period of time.
1.6 Conclusion
The inﬂuence of the internet and on-line resources on many aspects of life today is
currently of interest to economists and social scientists alike. This comes without a
surprise, as the internet has changed the way we do business, search for information
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and purchase goods and services. As users of the internet, we experience its power
to deliver information and services quickly. Our “ﬁngers do the walking” and get to
their objective in virtual space much more easily than ever before. For consumers,
the information and services available through the internet are available conveniently
and with fast, uninterrupted access twenty-four hours a day, which creates the feeling
that the internet speeds up the execution of tasks which used to take longer before
the wide-spread use of the internet.
This notion that the internet speeds up certain tasks is not always correct. In the
case of non-sequential search in the housing market the theoretical prediction of the
eﬀect of using internet resources as part of a home search is, ﬁrst of all, ambiguous.
As discussed above, since the use of the internet increases the search eﬃciency, a
home buyer who uses the internet has an increased number of choices and can ﬁnd a
suitable home faster, but at the same time there is an adjustment of the reservation
level so that rather than experiencing an eﬀect that speeds up the search time, the
home buyer beneﬁts from using the internet in the search beyond simply being able
to look at more choices. The internet is able to deliver speciﬁc information about
the features of the particular house, and allows the home buyer to browse through
choices that are better matched to his or her household than conventional methods
of search can provide. During the on-line search the home buyer might also be able
to look at a larger variety of types of choices, some that would not be available
through conventional methods, because perhaps of geographic location, or because
of a more narrow choice of oﬀers available in a newspaper advertisement, or a real
estate agency. These extra choices may be very well or very badly suited to the home
buyer relative to choices available through conventional methods. If in fact a Realtor
presents a speciﬁc type of houses to a home buyer because of commission ranges
or other geographical concerns, using the internet in the search would increase the
variance of the distribution of choices. We ﬁnd evidence in this study that there is a
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change in the distribution of match qualities either through increasing the mean or
through increasing the mean and the variance of the distribution of choices.
Here, Using data from the National Association of Realtors 2000 Home Buyer
and Seller Survey, and an auxiliary sample from the Current Population Survey,
August 2000 Supplement on Computer Ownership and Internet Use, we ﬁnd that
employing internet resources as part of the home search in the US housing market
tends to increase search durations. We conclude that since the internet increases
search durations, the more important aspect of internet use in the search is not the
ability to look at choices faster, but the ability to explore choices that are better
tailored to each home buyer by increasing the variety of choices available to consider.
This is an important ﬁnding as it relates to search durations in the housing market
and the use of the internet for this purpose, but it also has broad implications for
the relation between the role of the internet in markets and non-sequential search in
general.
This study presents important and interesting ﬁndings and sheds light on the
workings of non-sequential search in the housing market. However, it poses a number
of interesting questions suitable for further investigations. The housing market in
the US is one of the larger markets in the US were buyers perform non-sequential
search, but there are other important and extensive markets, such as the job market,
where job seekers search for suitable employment. It would be of great interest to
ﬁnd out whether the implications of search cost reductions for the duration of search
carry over to other markets. Clearly, the non-sequential manner of the search is an
important feature of this market which aﬀects the theory, and the empirical results.
The eﬀect of using the internet on the amount of search eﬀort exerted is another
topic of further research. We hope to address these and other related issues in further
studies.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables from the NAR and CPS Samples
NAR NAR
Full Within-state CPS
Sample Movers Only Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Within State Movers .850 1
(.358) (0) -
[1630] [1385]
Weeks of Search 14.98 15.97
(25.94) (26.99) -
[1746] [1350]
Internet Used in Search .298 .279
(.457) ( .449) -
[1787] [1385]
Internet Use at Home .345
- - (.475)
[121745]
Age Group 4.641 4.458 4.173
(2.248) (2.226) (2.999)
[1751] [1361] [121745]
Household Income Category 5.966 5.856 4.462
(2.174) (2.190) (2.753)
[1690] [1319] [103750]
Number of Children 1.738 1.743 1.428
(1.026) (1.039) (.895)
[1771] [1376] [121745]
White .880 .866 .838
(.325) (.340) (.368)
[1705] [1321] [121745]
Hispanic .060 .070 .106
(.238) (.255) (.308)
[1643] [1279] [121745]
Married Couple .656 .627 .664
(.475) (.484) (.472)
[1770] [1374] [121745]
Single Female Head of
Household
.178 .186 .219
(.383) (.389) (.418)
[1770] [1374] [121745]
Single Male Head of Household .091 .103 .116
(.287) (.305) (.321)
[1770] [1374] [121745]
Unmarried Couple .656 .627
(.475) (.484) -
[1770] [1374]
Number of Earners in
Household
1.559 1.587
( .528) (.525) -
[1693] [1323]
(Previous) Home Location:
Metropolitan Area
.235 .224 .269
(.424) (.417) (.455)
[1787] [1385] [103273]
(Previous) Home Location:
Suburb
.223 .194 .455
(.415) (.396) (.498)
[1787] [1385] [103273]
(Previous) Home Location:
Non-metropolitan / Rural
.063 .0533 .276
(.243) (.225) (.447)
[1787] [1385] [103273]
Note: Data in columns (1) and (2) from the National Association of Realtors 2000 Home Buyer
and Seller Survey. Data in column (3) from August 2000 Current Population Survey Supplement
on Computer Ownership and Internet Use. For each variable the mean value, the standard error (in
parenthesis), and the number of observations [in brackets] are presented. Age group deﬁnitions: (1)
less than 25 years old, (2) 25-29 years old, (3) 30-34 years old, (4) 35-39 years old, (5) 40-44 years
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old, (6) 45-49 years, (7) 50-54 years old, (8) 55-64 years, and (9) 65 years or older. Income category
deﬁnition: (1) under $25,000, (2) $25,000 - $29,999, (3) $30,000 - $34,999, (4) $35,000 - $39,999, (5)
$40,000 - $49,999, (6) $50,000 - $59,999, (7) $60,000 - $69,999, and (8) $70,000 or more.
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Figure 1-4: Distributions of Home Search Duration
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Figure 1-5: Standard Quantile Regression Results: Eﬀects of Covariates on the Log
of Weeks of Search
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Figure 1-6: Instrumented Quantile Regression Results: Eﬀects of Covariates on the
Log of Weeks of Search
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Figure 1-7: IQR Objective Functions (y-axis) vs. α (x-axis)
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Appendix A
Standard and Instrumented Quantile Regressions Comparison
Table 1.3 presents the coeﬃcients for the quantile regression models before and
after instrumenting for a possible individual heterogeneity in the model. Each coef-
ﬁcient reﬂects the eﬀect of internet use in the search in a separate regression at the
given quantile index and also either under the standard QR or the IQR model.
Table 1.3: Eﬀect of Internet Use: Comparison of Quantile Regression Results
QR IQR
Search Duration Quantile Index Internet Use Coeﬃcient Internet Use Coeﬃcient
Lasting (1) (2) (3)
One week τ = .1 0.405 0.000
(0.005) (0.992)
3 weeks τ = .2 0.282 0.330
(0.061) (0.830)
4 weeks τ = .3 0.401 0.712
(0.070) (0.786)
6 weeks τ = .4 0.158 1.139
(0.088) (0.796)
8 weeks τ = .5 0.224 1.765
(0.077) (0.879)
12 weeks τ = .6 0.087 1.392
(0.079) (0.829)
14 weeks τ = .7 0.212 1.605
(0.084) (0.896)
22 weeks τ = .8 -0.007 0.831
(0.091) (0.896)
36 weeks τ = .9 -0.151 -0.061
(0.114) (1.004)
Note: N=1183, standard errors in (parenthesis), (.) indicates signiﬁcance at the 90% level.
If those who are prone to search more through unobservable characteristics such
as pickiness, or in extreme terms perfectionism or obsessiveness in their personalities
are also likely to use the internet in their search for a house the resulting endogeneity
in the model will bias the results. In order to control for this possibility, we use a
simulated instrument for overall likelihood to use the internet in other activities. The
instrument is thus the mean internet use of each demographic group in the general
population divided by age, income, number of children, race, Hispanic origin, and
geographic characteristics such as type of urban/rural location and state of residence
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from which the search was conducted.
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Appendix B
Cox Proportional Hazards Model Results
Table 1.4 presents the results from the regression analysis using the Cox propor-
tional hazards model.
Table 1.4: Eﬀect of Internet Use on weeks of Search - Within State Movers Only
Instrument First Stage Second Stage
Mean Home Internet Use Coeﬃcient on Coeﬃcient on
By: Instrument Predicted Internet Use
NO INSTRUMENT -0.034
[0.47]
Age, Income 1.156 -1.453
[1.76] [1.79]
Age, Income, Children 0.870 -1.603
[1.38] [1.85]
Age, Income, 0.230 -1.448
Metro/Non-metro [1.55] [1.72]
Age, Income, 0.947 -1.345
Metro/Suburb/Non-metro [1.64] [1.62]
Note: t-statistics in brackets
In our regressions we control for diﬀerences in age, income, number of children in
the household, household composition, number of income earners, previous neighbor-
hood metropolitan status, state, and for various reasons for the move among home
buyers in the NAR data. Without instrumenting for internet use while searching for
a home with a predicted level of internet use by demographic categories, the eﬀect
of internet use is slightly negative, close to zero, and statistically insigniﬁcant. Once
any possible individual heterogeneity among home buyers in their internet use is ac-
counted for with an instrument such as the mean home internet use by age groups
and income categories from the CPS sample, the eﬀect of employing on-line resources
On the duration of home search becomes quite more negative and considerably more
signiﬁcant. Because of the non-linear nature of the empirical model used here, the
magnitude of the coeﬃcient of predicted internet use does not easily lend itself to in-
terpretation. The meaning of its sign however, is clear: the use of internet resources
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in home search tends to increase the duration of that search. Because of a negative
sign in the Cox model speciﬁcation, a more negative coeﬃcient coeﬃcient on internet
use in the second stage implies a longer search duration as a result of internet use.
This analysis suggests that overall, the internet aﬀects the search by changing the
types of houses a home buyer considers as part of the search rather than by simply
speeding the arrival rate of oﬀers as discussed in the theory section above.
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Chapter 2
Internet Listing and Time on the
Market for Residential Housing: A
Simultaneous Equations Approach
2.1 Introduction
This study explores the impact of listing a residential property for sale using on-line
resources on the time it takes until an oﬀer to sell the home is accepted. Time on
the market until a property is sold is a frequently explored topic in the real estate
literature. A large number of researchers have studied the impact of various factors,
circumstances and conditions on the length of time it takes a particular property
to sell. Most of this substantial body of literature, starting with Cubbin [2] and
Miller [11], has focused on the relationship between selling price and the duration
until the house is sold. This duration is commonly referred to as time on the market.
Cubbin argues that the homes’ quality is assessed by its listing price. He concludes
that higher price decreases the time on the market for homes. Miller, on the other
hand, argues a positive relationship between sales price and time on the market, but
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the results obtained by Miller are somewhat inconclusive. These authors have focused
on the impact of time on the market (an independent variable) on the selling price.
Others have attempted to explain the time on the market (the dependent variable)
as a function of the selling price. See Belkin, Hempel and McLeavey [1] as just one
example. The authors of this study estimate the time on the market using the spread
between the selling and the listing price of the home. While the authors recognize
the importance of the list price in determining the time until sale, they treat the list
price (and the selling price) as exogenous. Further studies in this literature, such as
Kang and Gardner [10] estimate the impact of market conditions such as mortgage
rates, volatility and ﬁnancing, or house attributes such as age of the home and its
amenities on time on the market.
In many of the studies conducted, the importance of all three variables: original
listing price, selling price and time until sale has been recognized. Yet by and large,
researchers have focused either on estimating time on the market or on predicting the
selling price, while treating the remaining two variables as exogenously determined.
Only recently have some authors used simultaneous models for the determination of
time on the market and sale price. Huang and Palmquist [8] use a two equation
structural model for the impact of environmental conditions on these two variables.
They acknowledge that the choice of an original list price aﬀects the outcome of both
the selling price and the time on the market. Yet, list price is included neither in their
model nor in their estimation approach. Work by Green and Vandell [5] considers
the choice of an asking price by the seller. The authors develop an optimal asking
price and time on the market model based on maximization of a net present value for
the home. A reservation price for the seller is based on the stream of bid arrivals. In
their model, the asking price is allowed to adjust while the home is on the market.
In continuation of the trends in this literature, in the present study we consider
a simultaneous equations model for the determination of the actual sale price and
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the duration of time on the market. We reﬁne the empirical model connecting listing
price, selling price and time on the market. Unlike previous research on this topic,
in our model we include the choice of a sale strategy by the seller or his/her agent
which aﬀects the above three variables. The list price, and the decisions leading to
the method used for listing the home are pre-determined, endogenous variables that
aﬀect the simultaneously determined selling price and time on the market. The listing
method includes the choice of the seller to use an agent or to sell the property oneself,
and the choice whether to use the internet as a means of listing the property for sale.
In this study we aim to answer the question: how does internet listing inﬂuence the
time on the market. Unlike the large number of studies in the pre-existing literature,
we are not concerned with the interplay between list, or sales price and time on the
market. By estimating a ﬁve equation model involving the choice to use an agent,
the choice to list using the internet, the original asking price, the selling price and
the time on the market, we account for the endogeneity among these variables, even
though we are interested only in the relationship between internet use and time on
the market. Since the relationship between selling price and duration until sale is not
of interest here, we are able to use a somewhat reduced form of the model which is
more robust to the particular speciﬁcation than previous models in the literature.
Wheaton [12] has developed a model of search and matching in the housing mar-
ket in which all home buyers are sellers as well, as opposed to models where new
construction or passing homes down to the next generation dominate the activities
in the housing market. Results from previous work by the current author show the
duration of search, until a home to purchase is found, increases when the internet is
used by the buyer in the home search. If the housing market behaves according to
Wheaton’s model, these results suggest we should expect to ﬁnd an increase in the
duration until a home is sold when the internet is used to list it 1. Since in this model
1According to Wheaton’s model, revized to include the eﬀect of internet use in the housing market
by the current author, the time until sale is z = λ(1−F (R))HsV . (See previous chapter.) When the pool
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the buyers are also sellers, we expect the amount of time by which the sale is slowed
down to correspond to the amount of time by which the home purchase is slowed
down as a result of internet use in the market.
We use data from the 2000 Home Buyer and Seller Survey, a US national level
survey collected by the the National Association of Realtors. In this data, we ﬁnd
an increase in the time on the market for residential homes in the US in response to
listing the property on-line. Furthermore, the amount of time by which the duration
until sale increases is almost exactly the same as the amount of time by which search
duration increases on the buyer’s side of the market. The results of this study, to-
gether with our previous results involving home buyer behavior and internet use show
evidence for a housing market where all buyers are sellers as well.
2.2 Theoretical Discussion
We consider the seller’s choices leading to the sale of the home in two steps. The ﬁrst
step is to determine the sale strategy. This involves three simultaneous decisions: use
an agent or sell as owner, use the internet to list or no on-line listing, and select the
initial listing price. These decisions temporally precede the accepting or rejecting of
subsequent oﬀers that determine the actual sale price and the duration of time on
the market. The maximization of the objective (the net present value of the home)
comes next. Figure 2-1 describes the time-line of the seller’s decisions involved.
Many of the studies in the literature, including Huang and Palmquist [8], and
Green and Vandell [5], use a hedonic reservation price model to describe the rela-
tionship between the observed sale price and the unobserved reservation price of the
seller. The reservation price determines the probability of accepting an oﬀer and thus
of potential buyers becomes more diverse as result of listing on-line, or when a set of better suited
to the home potential buyers view this home on-line, F (R) increses while the rest of te parameters
stay constant. As a result, z increases by the same amount as the duration until a home buyer ﬁnds
a home to purchase increases.
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Figure 2-1: Temporal Aspects of the Selling Decision Process
the duration until the house is sold. Furthermore the seller’s reservation price can
adjust as more information is gathered during the time the house is on the market
through the distribution and the frequency of arriving oﬀers. It can inﬂuence not
only the duration until sale, but the actual sale price by aﬀecting which particular
oﬀer is accepted. This gives rise to the simultaneous determination of the observed
selling price and time on the market.
The list price depends on the (initial) reservation price of the seller and therefore
it aﬀects both the sale price and the duration until sale. In this model, the list
price itself is pre-determined with respect to both the actual selling price and the
duration until sale. Because of the temporal separation between selecting a list price
and accepting an oﬀer with a particular sale price, the list price cannot be directly
aﬀected by either the selling price or the on the market duration. Another diﬀerence
of our model with previous models is the addition of the seller’s decisions about the
method used to sell the home. This involves the set of choices to use an agent or to
sell as owner, and whether or not to list the property for sale on the internet. Again,
the temporal separation between the two steps in the decision process, t0 and t1 in
ﬁgure 2-1, forces the sales method to be pre-determined with respect to the actual
selling price and the time on the market. The decision to use an agent or not, to list
on the internet or not and the original list price are simultaneously determined and
endogenous with respect to each other.
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2.2.1 Sales Strategy Decision
The decision to use on-line listing is aﬀected by the choice to use an agent and the
selection of a particular list price. As agents might have more knowledge and better
access regarding listing a home for sale on-line than individual home sellers have, the
decision to use the internet and to use an agent are co-determined. This is particularly
relevant for the time-frame of our data2. If a home seller is intent on using the new
internet technology, perhaps to increase the pool of potential oﬀers, he or she might
decide to use an agent to assist with listing the home on-line. The costs associated
with listing a home for sale on the internet are higher than the costs associated with
conventional listings. These costs include not only the know-how needed, but also
equipment such as digital cameras to provide the virtual tour photos, the computer
hardware and software and the internet connections needed, and exceed the costs of a
conventional listing methods. Consequently, only home sellers with a high reservation
price might be using the internet in their sale strategy, so that only homes in a certain
range of initial asking prices would be listed on-line.
Thus, the probability of using internet listing in the sale strategy is given by the
function g1(.):
Pr(Ij = 0|Aj, Lj, Xj) = g1(Aj, Lj, Xj; β1) + +1,
where Ij is a 0, 1 indicator for internet use in listing the home, Aj, is a 0, 1 indicator
of whether an agent’s services are used to assist with the sale, Lj, is the original
list price, and Xj includes demographic characteristics of the seller, and geographic
characteristics of the home.
Similarly, the decision to use an agent in the sale is determined by the function
g2(.):
Pr(Aj = 0|Ij, Lj, Xj) = g2(Ij, Lj, Xj; β2) + +2.
2In 1999, when our data was collected, the technology needed to list a home for sale on-line would
have been more readily available to real estate professionals than to individual home sellers.
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Agent use is aﬀected by the choice to use the internet and the selection of an
initial list price. A higher list price may prompt the seller to employ a real estate
agent. The match between a seller with a high listing price for the home and a buyer
with an appropriate level of housing consumption is more diﬃcult to achieve when
the home is oﬀered for sale by owner. A home with a high listing price would require
a larger, or more speciﬁc pool of potential bids. This can be obtained more easily
with the help of a real estate agent. In addition, if a home seller is intent on using
on-line resources to list the home, an agent’s knowledge may be needed to help list
the home on the internet.
The asking price is aﬀected by the decisions to use an agent, and to use the
internet. An agent can recommend a range of asking prices. This asking price range
might vary depending on the attributes of the house and the urgency of the seller to
sell the home.
It might also vary depending on whether the internet is used to list the property,
especially if the home seller or agent is looking to recover some of the costs of listing
on-line.
The third equation in the joint decision of the selling strategy deﬁnes the asking
price,
L = g3(Ij, Aj, Xj; β3) + +3,
as a function, g3(.), of the decision to use the internet to list the home as opposed
to using only conventional ways to list it (such as a newspaper advertisement), (I),
the decision to use an agent to assist with the sale (A), and the above demographic
characteristics of the seller and geographic characteristics of the home, (Xj). In each
of the above equations, βi is a vector of parameters, and +i is a stochastic component.
We adopt a linear speciﬁcation, and write these three equations in reduced form
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with respect to each other as:
A = X ′α1 + +1 = Aˆ+ +ˆ1,
I = X ′α2 + +2 = Iˆ + +ˆ2,
and
log(L) = X ′α3 + +3 = ˆlog(L) + +ˆ3.
where A is the agent use indicator, I is the internet use indicator, and L is the original
list price which enters in logarithmic terms here. The vectors αi denote the reduced
form coeﬃcients on the matrix of covariates that enters in each equation.
2.2.2 Hedonic Reservation Price and Time on the Market
The diﬀerence between the list price and the actual sales price has been described
using a reservation price model. Following Huang and Palmquist [8], sale occurs when
the oﬀer is higher than the seller’s reservation price. The observed selling price (P )
must then be a lower bound for the seller’s reservation price (P ). It is common
in hedonic price models and in stochastic frontier models in general, see Aigner at.
al., [3] to assume a truncated error structure. Here, the truncation of the error is
from below. As P = P  + u, the random component, u = P − P  > 0.
The reservation price of the seller is determined by the attributes of the home,
such as the type of structure and geographic location as well as the seller’s urgency
to sell, the number of times the home has been previously placed on the market by
this seller and the duration the house has been on the market and remained unsold.
Thus,
P = P  + u = h(T, Y ; γ) + v + u,
where h(T, Y ; γ) is the expected reservation price of the home seller. Here, T is the
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duration of time on the market and Y is a vector of exogenous parameters such as
market conditions and geographic, locational and structure type characteristics of the
home. There are two random variables: −∞ < v <∞ and 0 ≤ u <∞. One reﬂects
the usual error and the other reﬂects the systematic error between the sales price
and the reservation price. Huang and Palmquist [8] estimate this equation, together
with the time on the market equation in their model, using a maximum likelihood
technique which reﬂects the truncated nature of the error in the sales price equation3.
Since the authors above do not ﬁnd an empirical advantage to the more complicated
error structure in this model, for computational reasons we shall assume a bivariate
normal distribution for v and u here and ignore any truncation in the error.
The time on the market until the house is sold is governed by a hazards model
with:
log(T ) = k(P , Y ; δ) + ν,
The parameters of the function k(.) are designated by the vector δ, and ν is an
additive error term. We will assume that ν is normally distributed. The functional
form of the duration equation we use in our estimation is:
log(T ) = − log(δ) + δ′ log(P ) + δ′Y + ν.
In a regression setting, the above would simply become:
log(T ) = − log(δ) + δ′ log(P ) + δ′Y + ν.
In this speciﬁcation, the probability of receiving an oﬀer increases at ﬁrst and the
decreases as time goes by.
3Huang and Palmquist [8] calculate their results using a FIML technique assuming normally
distributed errors as well. They do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the results of the model
accounting for a truncated error structure and the model assuming normal errors in the sales price
equation.
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There is a number of functional forms used in the survival analysis literature for
describing duration, as well as diﬀerent methods of estimation. The functional form
above allows for a relatively straightforward estimation of the joint model. The above
model for the time on the market does not account for any possible truncation in the
data for duration until sale. It is possible that some homes remain unsold after a
given period of time and are taken oﬀ the market by the seller. We do not include
a truncation correction in our model because of the speciﬁc nature of the data used
here. In our sample, after removing observations with other missing data, no homes
remained unsold.
Since we are not interested in the impact of sales price on the duration on the
market, the above two equations can be written in reduced form with respect to each
other, so that:
log(P ) = Aˆ′a1 + Iˆ ′a2 + ˆlog(L)
′
a3 + Y
′a4 + ν4,
and
log(T ) = Aˆ′b1 + Iˆ ′b2 + ˆlog(L)
′
b3 + Y
′b4 + ν5.
The above ﬁve equations form a model involving the vector of endogenous, left
hand side variables (I, A, L, P, T ). We solve the system of these ﬁve equations by
simultaneously estimating the sales strategy equations as a ﬁrst step, and using the
predicted values (Iˆ, Aˆ, and ˆlog(L)) in the second step, simultaneous estimation of the
sales price and duration equations.
The existence of a correlation between +i in any of the sales strategy equations,
and νj in the sales price or duration equation in our setup is quite possible. The
reservation price of the seller aﬀects both the sales strategy decision and the accep-
tance of potential oﬀers. A home with a high initial asking price is likely to have
many amenities such as large rooms, ﬁreplaces and so on. The seller of such a home
is likely to use the services of an agent and perhaps also list it on-line, in order to
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gain exposure to a wider pool of buyers including those who prefer high levels of
housing consumption. The high reservation price would also induce the seller to be
choosy about the oﬀers he or she receives, aﬀecting the sale price and duration. In our
data, reservation prices and house amenities are unobservable, and the errors terms
between any of the sales strategy equations and the sale price/duration equations are
likely to be correlated.
2.3 Estimation Strategy
We employ a Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) technique in the estimation of this
model. Since we assume normally distributed errors, 3SLS is asymptotically equiva-
lent to the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation of this linear,
ﬁve equation system, and of course, much easier to compute than FIML. Since we
are only interested in the impact of internet use in the sale strategy for the duration
of time on the market, we can use a somewhat reduced form system rather than the
structural form of the equations we present in the theoretical discussion.
Many of the studies in the housing market literature have focused on the relation-
ship between selling price and time on the market. In order to estimate this joint
relationship, researchers such as Huang and Palmquist [8] estimate the structural
form simultaneous equation system. A similar approach here is not not necessary.
In addition, any misspeciﬁcation in any one equation can propagate throughout the
structural form system and aﬀect the results in all equations4. Yet, as we are inter-
ested in the impact of one left hand side variable, internet use (I), on another left
hand side variable, duration on the market (T ), in another equation, we cannot use
a completely reduced form estimation of the ﬁve equation system.
The estimation technique we employ is therefore similar to an equation by equa-
tion estimation of a recursive system of linear equations. In the triangular, or fully
4See Greene [6], p.760
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recursive system, each equation contains a left hand side variable that is predeter-
mined with respect to those in the following equation. A consistent estimation of
all equations of the system can be obtained. by performing Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS)) on the ﬁrst equation, using the estimates form it in the OLS regression of
the second equation, and so on. Since this technique results in consistent, but not
eﬃcient estimates, robust errors for the estimates need to be computed as well.
We can use a similar technique in the estimation of the simultaneous system at
hand. This ﬁve equation system is not strictly triangular, but in a sense, block
triangular. The ﬁrst three equations are pre-determined with respect to the last
two. We write the ﬁrst three equations which involve the sales strategy decision in a
reduced form with respect to each other:
A = X ′α1 + +1 = Aˆ+ +ˆ1,
I = X ′α2 + +2 = Iˆ + +ˆ2,
and
log(L) = X ′α3 + +3 = ˆlog(L) + +ˆ3.
where A is the agent use indicator, I is the internet use indicator, and L is the
original list price which enters in logarithmic terms here. The vectors αi denote the
reduced form coeﬃcients on the matrix of covariates that enters in each equation.
The matrix X includes demographic characteristics of the sellers such as income, age
and number of children, the urgency of the seller to sell the primary reasons for the
move, a measure of the number of internet listings of homes for sale in the seller’s
state, and the type of property.
We use a linear probability model for the ﬁrst two equations. While we acknowl-
edge the shortcomings of using this regression form for the 0, 1 indicators in this
model, the inclusion of the third simultaneous equation for the original asking price
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makes this estimation technique the most computationally feasible one. In addition,
results obtained by a bivariate probit estimation on the ﬁrst two equations give very
similar results to the ones obtained with a joint, linear probability estimation on these
two equations. As long as there is no cross correlation between +i in one equation
and an estimate of the respective left hand side variable in another, this technique
produces consistent estimates for the internet use, the agent use and the sales price.
There is no reason to expect that such correlation exists here. Thus, we can proceed
with the 3SLS estimation of the reduced form system for the sales strategy. This will
provide a ﬁrst step to the estimation of the eﬀect of internet use on the duration until
sale in the housing market.
We use estimates for I, A, and L from the 3SLS estimation of the above three
equations in the joint regressions of the estimation of P and T according to:
log(P ) = Aˆ′a1 + Iˆ ′a2 + ˆlog(L)
′
a3 + Y
′a4 + ν4,
and
log(T ) = Aˆ′b1 + Iˆ ′b2 + ˆlog(L)
′
b3 + Y
′b4 + ν5.
Here, Y is the matrix of covariates including market conditions, such as seasonal and
regional indicators, the number of times the home has been on the market, variables
describing the type of home, the primary reason for the seller’s move, and the urgency
of the seller to sell the home. We use a 3SLS technique for the joint estimation of
price (P ) and time on the market (T ) as well.
The coeﬃcient b2 is of interest in this study. It links internet use in the listing
strategy with the time on the market for the home. As the time on the market is in
logarithms, and internet use (I) is a variable that takes only the values
0 or 1, b2 has the interpretation of elasticity. Exponentiating this coeﬃcient (e
b2)
gives the change in duration until sale in terms of T when on-line listing is used in
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the selling strategy. The robust standard errors in the sales price and in the duration
equations are calculated using a parametric bootstrap technique [7].
2.4 Data
This study uses a cross-sectional survey data collected by the Research Division of the
National Association of Realtors (NAR). The data is summarized in the 2000 NAR
Proﬁle of Home Buyers and Sellers [4]. The survey includes recent home buyers from
all over the US. At the beginning of the year 2000, the NAR mailed a questionnaire
to 20,000 consumers who purchased or sold a home in 1999. The address database
was ultimately derived from courthouse records of recent home buyers in the United
States. This survey resulted in 1,778 usable observations. From these observations
we use answers to the question asked by the survey of home buyers: What did you
do to your previous home? To this there were around 1,000 non-blank answers that
include selling the home, attempting to sell unsuccessfully, or hold it as investment
property or as second home.
For those respondents who attempted to sell their previous home, the survey also
contains information about the ways the home was listed, including listing using the
internet. Whether an agent was used in the sale and the type of agent was given.
The survey contains information about the original asking price, the selling price, the
duration until an oﬀer was accepted, as well as some geographic and demographic
information about the seller. The survey does not contain data about the house
features, such as size, age or speciﬁc location and amenities of the property.
Table 2.1 lists the descriptive statistics of the data used here. The average respon-
dent to the home seller part of the NAR survey is between 44 and 49 years old. The
average income is between $50,000 and $59,999 in 1999 dollars. The mean number
of children for the respondents here is 1.79 and 43.4% of the respondents have any
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children. There are 74.4% married respondents and only 2.9% are Black. In terms
of demographics, the average home seller in the NAR sample has a higher income
and has slightly more children than the average person in the US as recorded by
the 2000 Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS, conducted biennially by the
US Census Bureau is representative of the population in the US at large. There are
substantially fewer Blacks and Hispanic Origin respondents in the NAR survey used
here than there are in the general US population in 2000. This is to be unexpected,
as the respondents here are homeowners, who tend to be more aﬄuent than the av-
erage US resident. Credit markets might discriminate against potential homeowners
on the basis of race and Hispanic origin. This could account for the substantially
lower number of Black and Hispanic origin home sellers recorded here than residents
in the general US population. Homeowners tend to be more frequently married as
well. The average number of married respondents in the 2000 CPS is 65.6%, and in
our NAR sample there are 74.4% married respondents. Perhaps this is due to credit
markets favoring married couples over single home buyers as well.
The average number of years the home sellers in this survey have owned the
property before placing it on the market is just under 10 years. About 48% are in a
rush to sell it and the primary reason for making the move (and perhaps selling the
previous home) most frequently mentioned is the desire for more space, followed by
corporate relocation or a new job. When an attempt to sell the previous home was
made by the respondent, only 3.34% tried to sell unsuccessfully and consequently still
own the home. Respondents in this survey who tried to sell, placed the home on the
market anywhere between 1 and 5 times, the mean being 1.19 times, and only 14%
tried more than once. The average number of weeks the home was on the market is
12.8 for the entire sample and 9.53 weeks for the homes that sold on the ﬁrst try.
The average asking price is $168.3 thousand and the average selling price is $161.9
thousand. The average selling price is lower than the average asking price as to be
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expected from the reservation price model. However, there are 66 observations in our
sample where the sale price exceeded the asking price.
In the NAR sample of home sellers, 68.6% used an agent to sell the home and
13.9% listed the home for sale by owner. Whether an agent was used or not, 27.9%
of the home sellers indicated that the internet was used as a method to list the home.
This overall internet use number can be broken down into internet use when and
agent was employed in the home sale process and when the home was listed for sale
by owner. Among the agent assisted homes on the market, 37.5% used the internet as
a listing method for the property. In contrast, only 6.87% percent of the for sale by
owner homes used the internet to list the home. In 1999 more agents had access and
knowledge about listing a property using on-line resources. At that particular time,
not many individual homeowners had the resources and the knowledge necessary to
list their home on the internet. This is reﬂected in the much smaller number of
properties for sale by owner in our sample listed using the internet. This shows there
is a diﬀerential advantage between homeowners and agents relating to listing a home
for sale using the internet. The choice to list on-line or not depends on the choice to
sell with or without the services of an agent. This diﬀerence in the skills and resources
needed to list a home for sale on the internet may be decreasing as time progresses. In
the fast changing environment of internet use in the recent past, even a couple of years
bring a substantial change in the categories of internet savvy individuals. However,
in 1999 the use of digital technology and environments is just becoming popular. At
this time, home sales professionals are already able to use this technology to list a
home for sale, while the average private individual by and large, is not equipped to
do so. In 1999, many private individuals had suﬃcient knowledge to search for home
to buy using the internet, but as listing a home for sale on the internet requires a lot
more internet speciﬁc skills and new equipment, such as digital cameras, the usual
homeowner in 1999 would not have been able to list a home for sale using the internet
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by himself or herself.
The homes oﬀered for sale using an agent have a higher mean initial asking price
and a higher mean selling price than the respective mean prices for the homes oﬀered
for sale by owner. On average, higher priced properties are sold when internet listing
was used than when the home was not listed using the internet. This points to a
decision or a strategy about how to sell a home involving whether to use an internet
listing, whether to use an agent to assist with the sale and at the same time what
initial asking price to select. These joint decisions then determine the selling price
and the duration until the house is sold. The data points to a possibility that this
simultaneous decision process is in fact happening here.
2.5 Results
The results from the ﬁrst stage in the estimation are presented in table 2.2. Higher
income increases the initial asking price. This is consistent with the possibility that a
higher income corresponds to a higher reservation price of the seller. Higher income
could also be correlated with owning a larger, better equipped home. The attributes
of the home for sale, such as living area size, number of rooms, ﬁreplaces and so on
are not available in our data. The observed eﬀects on income could be largely due to
home characteristics that are unobservable here.
The number of total internet listings in the seller’s state of residence has a some-
what negative impact on the initial list price. The larger the fraction of homes that
are oﬀered on the internet for sale relative to the total number of listings in the state,
the lower the initial asking price. This eﬀect could signal that there is less friction
in a housing market in which buyers are able to locate a suitable choice to purchase
faster an easier through the internet. In this situation, the housing market becomes
more competitive and the price sellers can expect to get for their home is reduced.
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Homes within cities are listed with a lower initial asking price that other homes and
so are homes in areas where the primary reason for the move indicated by the seller is
decline of the neighborhood. This relationship between location an reservation price,
reﬂected in the original asking price does not come as a surprise, and is consistent
with the stylized facts in the housing market literature about the desirability of home
location.
Higher income also increases the probability that the internet is used as part of
the selling strategy. An increase in the age of the seller corresponds to a higher asking
price and a lower probability of using the internet. Age itself may be correlated with
owning a larger, or more expensive home. The eﬀect is similar to the relationship
between income and original asking price with relation to (unobservable here) house
characteristics. Older sellers are less likely to employ the internet as a means to list
their home. Older individuals may be less aware of the possibility of on-line listing
for a home on the market. They are therefore less likely to employ the internet when
they are listing a home for sale by owner. They are also not likely to consider the
possibility of an agent using on-line resources to list the home, and they would not
necessarily seek out and employ a particularly internet savvy agent. Both of these
factors contribute to the relationship between the seller’s age and internet use for
listing the home for sale. These considerations are particularly relevant to the time of
the data sample used in this study. In 1999 the internet had just started inﬂuencing
economic activities. Current Population Survey data from this time period suggests
that age is by far one of the biggest factors, together with education, that inﬂuence
internet use for various purposes. As income is a reasonable proxy for educational
attainment, the eﬀect of income on internet use could be due to the eﬀect of education
on internet use in this data. The eﬀect of income and age on internet use when listing
a home, or employing an agent to do so are consistent with established facts about
an individual’s demographics and internet use in various activities.
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Home sellers in the Western region of the US are more likely to use the internet as
means to list a home relative to all other geographic regions. The asking price is also
signiﬁcantly higher in the Western US than in all other regions. It is possible that
this eﬀect is due to a housing market in the Western region of the US that sustains
both a higher asking and a higher sales price compared to the rest of the country.
This possibility is supported here by the signiﬁcantly higher selling prices we ﬁnd in
the Western US in our regressions. In addition, it is likely that a higher proportion
of internet savvy home sellers live in the Western US, and thus are more likely to use
the internet to list a home for sale. As shown by our sales price regression, a higher
list price is not associated with more internet listings. Thus, internet savvy, rather
than an expensive home to sell may be driving the decision to use the internet in the
selling strategy. None of the variables examined here have a signiﬁcant impact on the
decision to use an agent in the listing and sale of the home.
The estimation of simultaneously determined selling price and time on the market
is presented in table 2.3. The table shows the coeﬃcients from the 3SLS regression
for the eﬀect of the covariates on each variable: logarithm of the selling price and
logarithm of the weeks until an oﬀer for the sale of the home was accepted5. The
internet used, agent used and the logarithm of the asking price variables in table 2.3
are the residuals from the joint estimation of internet use, agent use and the logarithm
of the asking price from table 2.2.
The most important result to note is that using the internet to list a home signif-
icantly increases the duration of the home on the market compared to using conven-
tional listing methods. The elasticity of time on the market with respect to internet
use is 0.347 This translates in an increase of in an increase of about 1.4 weeks added
5There are some observations in the data were sale that did not occur, and homeowner still owns
the property after placing it unsuccessfully on the market. However, after excluding observations
with missing data for any of the variables used none of the observations resulting in no sale were
usable in the regressions performed. Assuming (as it is customary) that data is missing at random
there is no need to correct for a truncation problem in the data.
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to the time on the market at the mean of the distribution of sale times. The mean
selling time for this sample is 12.8 weeks until an oﬀer for sale is accepted. This result
is consistent with our previous ﬁndings pointing to an increase in the duration until
a buyer in this market ﬁnds a home to purchase. The above two results are consis-
tent with Wheaton’s model of equilibrium in the housing market where all buyers are
sellers. If the internet use as a medium for buying and selling homes increases the
duration until a home is bought, in an equilibrium situation it is natural to expect
that the internet increases the duration of sale by the same amount. Previous ﬁndings
about the role of the internet in the duration of search point to an increase of about
1.6 weeks at the mean duration of search. The mean duration of home search for the
sample of home buyers who previously owned a home is about 14 weeks of search
until ﬁnding a home that is eventually purchased by this home buyer.
We ﬁnd that the more times on the market a home has been placed, the longer
it takes for it to sell. This is not surprising: a home that does not sell the ﬁrst
time a seller attempts to do so, is likely to stay in the market longer in subsequent
attempts. This would happen when the home has undesirable features either in
terms of amenities or location. Subsequent attempts to sell this undesirable property
result in longer times on the market even when it does sell. Alternatively, the home
may be incorrectly priced the ﬁrst time an attempt was made to sell it. As the
seller gains information about the market, he or she can make revisions to his or her
reservation price in subsequent attempts to sell it. However, there is no signiﬁcant
impact either on the initial asking price or on the resulting sales price of the number
of times the home was oﬀered for sale by this homeowner. Therefore, mis-pricing
and subsequent correction is not likely to be driving the number of times a home is
placed for sale. Rural homes take longer to sell than other properties, and so do ones
in declining neighborhoods. Sellers for whom the primary reason to move is decline
of the neighborhood, sell the home for a lower average price than when the primary
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reason for the move is not associated with neighborhood decline.
The sale price is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the decision to use the internet in
the sale strategy. The variables that have the largest impact on the selling price are
income and original asking price. The higher the seller’s income the higher the selling
price. It is likely that larger, more desirable and consequently more expensive homes
are owned and sold by individuals with higher incomes. Since in this data we cannot
control for the amenities of the home, this eﬀect is expressed here through income.
The higher the asking price, the higher the selling price as well. If a reservation
price is driving the seller’s selection of an initial asking price, and also inﬂuencing
the acceptance of oﬀers, we expect to ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of asking price on the
selling price. The location of the home with relation to the type of neighborhood
inﬂuences the selling price. Relative to resort properties and other types of homes,
city neighborhood and suburban homes sell for less, by about the same amount. Rural
properties on average are less expensive than resort properties and other homes, but
are closer in price to them than city and suburban homes are.
Using an agent to assist with the sale has no eﬀect on selling price. This result
is consistent with previous studies in the literature. Jud [9] ﬁnds that real estate
brokers do not inﬂuence the prices of the houses they sell relative to homes sold by
the owner. He ﬁnds that the brokers instead inﬂuence the level of housing consumed.
One interesting result that comes out of this analysis is that using an agent in the sale
increases the duration of time on the market by about 1.6 weeks. While agents may
not speed up the sale of a home relative to properties for sale by owner, they may
have a role in facilitating the process after the an oﬀer for sale has been accepted. It
is also likely that the main role if an agent representing the seller is to provide a ﬂow
of appropriate buyers, for example by helping list the property on line, rather than
to speed up the acceptance of such oﬀers. Once the role of an agent to assist with
the listing and sale strategy has been accounted for, the presence of an agent actually
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increases the time on the market.
2.6 Conclusion
Time on the market, initial asking price, the actual selling price and the decisions
about the selling strategy in the residential housing market are jointly determined.
Previous research in this area has not estimated this simultaneous model in its en-
tirety, frequently resulting in endogeneity induced bias of the results. This study
presents a econometric model for the joint estimation of the duration of time on the
market, the selling price, the asking price and the decision to use and agent in the sale
and to use on-line resources to list the home. After accounting for the endogenous
determination of the ﬁve variables above, we concentrate on examining the eﬀect of
internet listing on the duration until an oﬀer for sale is accepted.
We use a 3SLS estimation approach for the analysis of the impact of internet
listing on the duration until sale in the residential housing market. We estimate a
somewhat reduced form of the ﬁve equation system which allows us to discern the
impact of on-line listing on the duration of time on the market for residential housing
in the US. Many researchers in this area have worked on estimating the relationship
between selling price and time on the market. In this study, however, we do not
focus on the relationship between selling price and duration until sale. Concentrating
simply on internet listing and time on the market, we can employ a more robust
to exact speciﬁcation form of our regression equations than a structural form model
estimation would allow. We use data from the 2000 Home Buyer and Seller Survey
collected by the National Association of Realtors. We ﬁnd that using the internet to
list a house increases its time on the market. The results presented here are consistent
with previous ﬁndings pertaining to the use of the internet and the duration of search
until a buyer locates a home to purchase. These results, together with the ﬁndings
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of the present study show for a housing market where all buyers are sellers.
We ﬁnd that internet use as part of the listing strategy in the housing market
in the US increases the duration of time on the market by about 1.4 weeks at the
mean duration of time on the market. This result is to be expected in a situation
in the housing market where all buyers are sellers. In a previous study of the eﬀect
of internet use on the buyer’s side of the housing market we ﬁnd a similar increase
in the duration of search when the internet is used. These two results suggest a
housing market as modeled by Wheaton in [12]. When all buyers are sellers, we ﬁnd
evidence that as buyers search for longer periods using the internet, the corresponding
properties listed for sale on the internet take longer to sell as well. Internet listing as
part of the sales strategy has no eﬀect on the selling price of the home.
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Table 2.1: Means and Percentages of Key Variables for Home Sellers
Mean Percent N
1. Age group 5.48 — 914
2. Income Category 7.66 — 861
3. Number of Children 1.79 — 922
Has any children — 43.4 922
4. Married — 74.4 922
5. Black — 2.90 897
6. Hispanic Origin — 4.00 850
7. Location of Previous Home — — 920
Within a City — 43.8 920
Suburban Neighborhood — 41.3 920
Rural — 12.0 920
8. In a Rush to Sell — 47.8 655
9. Length Owned (years) 9.85 — 914
10. Previous Home — — 928
Sold using agent — 68.6 928
Sold by owner — 13.9 928
Hold as Investment — 8.51 928
Tried to Sell Unsuccessfully — 3.34 928
11. Times This Seller Tried to Sell 1.19 — 716
More than once — 14.0 716
12. Time on the Market (weeks) 12.8 — 719
13. Original Asking Price (thousands) $168.3 — 671
14. Actual Sale Price (thousands) $161.9 — 682
15. Internet Used to List — 27.9 928
Agent and Internet Used — 37.5 637
For Sale by Owner and Internet Used — 6.87 291
Note: Income categories: 1 - Under $25,000, 2 - $25,000 to 29,999, 3 - $30,000 to 34,999, 4 - $35,000
to 39,999, 5 - $40,000 to 44,999, 6 - $45,000 to 49,999, 7 - $50,000 to 59,999, 8 - $60,000 to 69,999,
9 - $70,000 to 99,999, 10 - $100,000 to 124,999, 11 - $125,000 to 149,999, 12 - $150,000 or over. Age
groups: 1 - less than 25 years, 2 - 25 to 29, 3 - 30 to 34, 4 - 35 to 39, 5 - 40 to 44, 6 - 45 to 49, 7 -
50 to 54, 8 - 55 to 64, 9 - 65 years or older.
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Table 2.2: Joint Estimation of Internet Use, Agent Use and Original Asking Price
Coeﬃcient in Coeﬃcient in Coeﬃcient in
Equation for Equation for Equation for
LN(Asking Price) Internet Use Agent Use
(1) (2) (3)
1. Income 0.094 0.016 0.005
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006)
2. Age 0.086 -0.015 0.013
(0.015) (0.011) (0.009)
3. Number of Children -0.005 0.006 0.016
(0.030) (0.022) (0.017)
4. In a Rush to Sell 0.030 -0.048 0.050
(0.057) (0.042) (0.041)
5. Number of Homes Listed on -0.038 -0.002 0
the Internet in Each State (0.014) (0.010) (0.008)
6. Location: -0.384 0.073 0.126
Within a City Neighborhood (0.175) (0.128) (0.100)
7. Location: -0.256 0.036 0.144
Suburban (0.174) (0.128) (0.100)
8. Location: -0.252 0.142 0.178
Rural (0.183) (0.135) (0.104)
9. Primary Reason for the Move: 0.033 0.029 -0.026
Space Considerations (0.089) (0.066) (0.051)
10. Primary Reason for the Move: 0.094 0.029 0.028
Corporate Relocation or New Job (0.109) (0.081) (0.063)
11. Primary Reason for the Move: 0.098 -0.054 -0.093
Health/Age (0.174) (0.128) (0.091)
12. Primary Reason for the Move: -0.281 -0.086 0.037
Decline of Previous Neighborhood (0.091) (0.117) (0.091)
13. Intercept 10.7 0.186 0.664
(0.267) (0.197) (0.153)
R2 0.31 0.06 0.04
N 514 514 514
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, (.) indicates signiﬁcance to the 10% level. Type of home
(single family, apartment, etc.) and US region indicators are included in the speciﬁcation in each
equation.
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Table 2.3: Joint Estimation of Duration and Price Equations
Coeﬃcient in Equation for Coeﬃcient in Equation for
LN(Weeks on the Market) LN(Sale Price)
(1) (2)
1. Internet Used (residual) 0.347 -0.024
(0.118) (0.037)
2. Agent Used (residual) 0.473 -0.019
(0.157) (0.038)
3. LN(Asking Price) (residual) 0.008 0.898
(0.075) (0.070)
4. Income -0.023 0.096
(0.021) (0.006)
5. In a Rush to Sell 0.115 0.014
(0.104) (0.032)
6. Number of Times This Seller 0.688 0.006
Previously Tried to Sell the Home (0.086) (0.025)
7. Location: 0.301 -0.450
Within a City Neighborhood (0.214) (0.091)
8. Location: 0.095 -0.307
Suburban (0.213) (0.082)
9. Location: 0.565 -0.294
Rural (0.226) (0.082)
10. Primary Reason for the Move: 0.026 -0.090
Space Considerations (0.148) (0.059)
11. Primary Reason for the Move: -0.040 -0.078
Corporate Relocation or New Job (0.196) (0.064)
12. Primary Reason for the Move: -0.038 0.396
Health/Age (0.458) (0.215)
13. Primary Reason for the Move: 0.777 -0.570
Decline of Previous Neighborhood (0.245) (0.190)
13. Intercept 1.64 10.9
(0.412) (0.149)
R2 0.30 0.80
N 389 389
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis, (.) indicates signiﬁcance to the 5% level. Parametric
bootstrap with 200 replications used for calculating the robust standard errors. Type of home
(single family, apartment, etc.), season and US region indicators are included in the speciﬁcation
(both equations).
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Chapter 3
Social Capital, Economic
Incentives and Voter Turnout:
Who Votes in Local versus
National elections? Evidence from
the US General Social Survey.
3.1 Introduction
This study explores the importance of social capital as deﬁned through the connec-
tions one has with the local community and socioeconomic status for voter turnout
in national as opposed to local elections in the US. What individual characteristics
determine voter turnout in the two extreme levels of political participation through
voting, and is there any systematic diﬀerence of those characteristics in diﬀerent size
communities? The questions pertaining to political participation are crucial to the
understanding of many issues in political economy. Our deﬁnition and understanding
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of the ways through which citizens get involved in the political process encompasses
a wide variety of activities. They include voting, political activism through interest
groups, lobbying and informing others. Yet, a central issue in political participation
remains to be voting.
Understanding voter turnout and its relationship to individual voter characteris-
tics is important in itself. The the socioeconomic and demographic makeup of the
particular voter’s community is also of interest for turnout. Knowing who votes
promotes our understanding of the economic and personal trade-oﬀ decisions an indi-
vidual makes when governmental and redistribution issues are at stake. In addition,
understanding voter turnout is crucial for estimation procedures in political economy
that involve the median voter model. Pinpointing more closely the subset of potential
voters in a community that do in fact inﬂuence the political decisions permits a better
identiﬁcation of the median voter. Subsequent tests of the median voter model can
then employ the median turning out voter, rather than the median potential voter or
resident.
Given its importance for a number of questions in political economy, the notion
of who votes has been studied extensively and from many angles since the 1960’s. In
these studies, individual level survey data or aggregate voter turnout data has been
employed to establish diﬀerent types of results. In terms of the aggregate level studies,
lower level elections have been characterized with a lower turnout than national elec-
tions in the United States [5] 1. Related to this issue are the ﬁndings of Campbell [3],
who showed that voter turnout increases in presidential election years but declines
in midterm-election years at the national level in the US, and those of Burnham [1],
who discovered the tendency in the US to vote for the more prestigious oﬃces but
not for the lower level oﬃces listed on the same ballot. Cross national studies such
as [5] suggest that the above facts for national versus. lower level elections may hold
1This fact does not hold for some other countries such as Japan.
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for some and not for other countries. The question: what are the individual charac-
teristics of the voters that turnout to vote in one but not in the other level of election
remains, at least for US national versus. lower level elections.
Similarly, the evidence for the overall amount of turnout in municipal versus.
national elections for small vs. large cities or urban vs. rural areas is mixed [8].
Sidney Verba and Norman Nie have summarized two possible models that govern the
rural-urban turnout diﬀerences [11]. The ﬁrst one is the degradation-of-community
argument that supposes a smaller number of interpersonal and social relationships
in larger cities. This leads to a smaller amount of monitoring of who participates in
the political process through voting. It allows for voting “free riders” in the larger
communities that have an easier time avoiding their civic duties in large cities, which
leads to a lower turnout in all types of elections as the city size increases. In this
sense, smaller communities have a higher level of political awareness that leads to
an increased level of perceived political eﬀectiveness. The eﬀect of this political
eﬀectiveness perceived by the members of the community is then ampliﬁed as per-
ceived eﬀectiveness becomes realized. The authors’ investigations ﬁnd support for this
decline-of-community in larger cities model. The second model, widely supported by
Milbrath [7], argues that increasing city size facilitates the ﬂow of information, and
with the increased number of informed potential voters comes a higher turnout in ur-
ban areas. The urban population is more frequently bombarded by political stimuli
in the form of information about political issues from other voters. There may also
be an additional eﬀect of city size on voting turnout if perhaps higher income, more
educated potential voters live in larger cities, and those characteristics are positively
correlated with voter turnout. In contrast to the ﬁrst model, this argument implies
an increase in the voter turnout in larger cities for both national and sub-national
elections.
There are a number of facts that have been established about individual char-
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acteristics as they relate to voter turnout starting with Milbrath [7]. He concludes
that levels of participation are highly correlated with socioeconomic status, income
and education levels. He ﬁnds, as mentioned above, that urbanization increases the
likelihood of political participation. Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone [9] have determined
that in national elections in the US, the likelihood that a voter turns out is very
positively correlated with income. Higher levels of educational attainment also in-
crease the probability of voting in national elections. Political participation in terms
of voting peaks at mid-life, and then declines as perhaps health issues prevent older
people from turning out to vote. Older individuals are never-the-less active in terms of
other forms of political participation. This supports an argument that political par-
ticipation in general is positively correlated with community involvement. Retired
individuals possess the means in terms of time and resources to become involved in
issues of local interest. They are also less mobile, and Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone do
ﬁnd that mobile individuals are less likely to vote, especially in local elections. Mar-
riage tends to increase the probability of voter turnout for both spouses. There is an
especially low turnout within young unmarried individuals, perhaps because the sense
of belonging to a community is low, while mobility is high among this demographic
group. These ﬁndings have not gone without question. In a study of national election
voter turnout in West Virginia, Gerald Johnson [6] argues that a state with low levels
of the socioeconomic variables that positively inﬂuence voter turnout (as addressed
above) has had consistently high levels of voter turnout in presidential elections.
Despite the large amount of diﬀerent types of evidence amassed, there still are
unanswered questions. There are few studies conducted that investigate the relevant
individual characteristics in large vs. small cities or more generally in urban vs. rural
areas. In the US such studies are virtually non existent perhaps because of the lack
of national data on municipal elections. Similar studies within any one country are
rare as well. Some cross country comparisons [8] that compare urban and rural voting
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turnout do exist. However, there is no evidence whether the probability to turn out
to vote in terms of income, for example, is the same across diﬀerent size communities
and if there are any signiﬁcant diﬀerences of this turnout probability depending on the
scope of election. In other words, we have not answered the question whether richer
people in cities are more likely to vote in local elections or in national ones? This
entire family of related questions can be posed a number of diﬀerent ways. Maybe
richer rural dwellers vote with equal probability in all levels of elections, but urban
voters are more selective about the elections they participate in depending on their
income because of a urban “free rider” problem. In this case, in aggregates we might
observe a positive correlation of voter turnout with income, while it is possible that
this relationship is mainly driven by the larger numbers of richer voters in large cities,
in the absence of a similar income relationship for rural voters. The same questions
can be asked about education, age, sex, race, marital status, and mobility.
If voter turnout is to some extent driven by social capital we are similarly unaware
of the diﬀerential eﬀects the amount of a voter’s social capital has on voting in national
vs. local elections, and if there are any substantial diﬀerences among rural and urban
residents. Is social capital more important for rural or for urban voters in their
decision to turnout to vote. If yes, are there any diﬀerences in its importance in the
decision to vote depending on the scope of election? At this point we do not know
the answers to any of these speciﬁc individual level voting turnout questions.
This study asks what type of voters, in terms of individual characteristics, social
capital (personal connections to the local community), and local capital ownership
(such as home-ownership), turn out to vote in national as opposed to local elections.
We ﬁnd that the demographic characteristics: sex, marital status, race, number of
children, and income do not inﬂuence the diﬀerential decision to vote in national only
as opposed to national and local level elections. However, years of education play
a central role in this voting decision. More educated voters tend to vote locally as
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well as nationally rather than nationally only. We conclude that civic duty and lower
voting costs for educated voters drive these voters to participate nationally as well as
locally.
Social capital measured through length lived in the particular community and
the size of the community are imperative for this diﬀerential voting decision. The
more connected a voter is to his or her local municipal unit, the more this voter is
likely to vote both locally and nationally rather than to vote only at the national
level. However, we also ﬁnd that monetary incentives such as local property taxes
and values or (Federal) Social Security disbursements have little with the diﬀerential
voting decision.
Finally, as the data used in this study contains self-reported voting information, we
asses the need for correcting our results to account for the over-reporting of turnout
recorded in the literature. In their work, Brian Silver and his co-authors [10] ﬁnd
evidence that more educated voters tend to misreport their actual turnout when
asked whether they voted in an election. The evidence in this study is with regard to
National level elections in the US. In the present work, we are interested in diﬀerential
eﬀects in national vs lower level elections and therefore we are concerned only about
diﬀerential misreporting of voting between the two election modes. While our results
conﬁrm the presence of overall misreporting at the national level in the US, we do
not ﬁnd a large diﬀerential misreporting eﬀect. We are conﬁdent that the results we
present are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by a potential misreporting bias.
3.2 Theoretical Discussion
The reasons behind an individual’s voting turnout decision can be framed in a simple
rational cost-beneﬁt framework. A citizen turns out to vote when the beneﬁts from
doing so outweigh the cost from voting. The beneﬁts increase in a number of variables.
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As noted by [5], participation in politics (in particular through voting) is higher
when the system’s capacity to respond to and accommodate the voter’s preferences
is greater and when the voters take on their civic duty of political involvement with
higher levels of responsibility and competence. A national level government has a
higher system capacity in its re-distributional and legislative power. The individual
voters can more eﬀectively control a local government and steer it toward satisfying
their own individual preferences, because of the relative importance of their vote.
Thus, theoretically there are two opposing eﬀects that might steer potential voters in
their choice to vote or abstain in national vs. local elections.
In the decision whether to vote as a citizen in a large vs. a small community, voters
similarly face two opposing eﬀects. The civic responsibility in a small community is
higher not only because of the larger share every voter carries, but also because
of a potentially stricter monitoring of participation. A higher level of community
involvement may result in higher level turnout in smaller communities. However, as
information is more easily transmitted in urbanized areas, larger city voters may be
better informed and able to carry out their civic responsibility with a higher degree
of competence, leading to a higher turnout in larger cities. These arguments would
hold for national as well as local elections.
Because of these opposing eﬀects, voter turnout in in national vs. local elections,
and in small vs. large communities can in theory go either way. In addition, cer-
tain demographic groups in each of the voting situations above may carry a larger
share of the civic responsibility or ability to inﬂuence the direction of the vote. This
would occur when the educational levels or the economic costs to voting diﬀer be-
tween demographically distinct groups. Furthermore, when a voter is one of many
voters sharing similar preferences, a “free rider” eﬀect may be present in any type of
community or election. When a voter is less likely to be the pivotal voter he or she
is more likely to abstain and avoid the costs of voting.
93
With the above considerations in mind, the standard model of voter turnout in-
volves a maximum likelihood estimation of the binary dependent variable in answer to
the question “Did you vote?” in the appropriate election. The right hand side matrix
of independent variables, X includes demographic indicators of age, sex, race, marital
status, income, mobility, and social capital variables including home-ownership and
membership in various organizations, as well as a variable indicating the logarithm
of the city size.
The conditional probability of voting Pr(Y ) is deﬁned as
Pr(Y ) = F (X ′β)
where F () represents the normal or the logistic (Λ(X ′β) = e
X′β
1+X′β ) cumulative dis-
tribution function. The estimates of the coeﬃcients in the above setup do not have
as straight forward an interpretation as do the coeﬃcients from OLS regressions. In
particular the coeﬃcients in the model using the normal distribution (known as pro-
bit model) do not represent an estimate of the amount of change in the dependent
variable that results from a unit increase in an independent variable. Instead, the
probit coeﬃcients provide an estimate of the amount of change on the cumulative
standard normal distribution that would result from a unit change in an independent
variable, all other variables held constant.
To estimate the marginal eﬀect of a single variable on the probability of voting for
a particular type, or sub-population of voters, after estimating the probit equation
for each respondent, this estimate can be converted to a probability by evaluating
this number on the standard normal CDF. In this study we use a maximum likeli-
hood model based on the logistic distribution in part because of the relative ease of
interpretation of the exponentiated resulting coeﬃcients. Using a normal or a logistic
distribution in the model gives similar results in most cases, except for when there is
a very large proportion of “yes” or a very large proportion of “no” voting outcomes.
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Yet, there is no strong theoretical reason for preferring one distributional choice over
the other.
3.3 Estimation Strategy
The regression analysis used in this study employs a maximum likelihood multinomial
logistic regression model for the eﬀect of voter characteristics on the propensity to
vote in local and/or national level election in the United States. The multinomial
(multiple modes) logistic model assumes there is a number of outcomes, four in our
case, Y ∈ I = {0, 1, 2, 3}. The categories of outcomes Y are labeled in the above
manner without any speciﬁc ordering between them.
We then estimate the multinomial logit model, where the coeﬃcients β1, β2, and
β3 correspond to each category with the probability of outcome according to the
logistic distribution:
Pr(Y = 0) =
1
1 + eX′β1 + eX′β2 + eX′β3
,
Pr(Y = 1) =
eX
′β1
1 + eX′β1 + eX′β2 + eX′β3
,
Pr(Y = 2) =
eX
′β2
1 + eX′β1 + eX′β2 + eX′β3
,
and
Pr(Y = 3) =
eX
′β3
1 + eX′β1 + eX′β2 + eX′β3
.
The coeﬃcient β0 = 0 is restricted for identiﬁcation purposes of the model and the
outcome Y = 0 is called the base category. The choice of base category and the
consequent restriction of its coeﬃcient β0 is certainly arbitrary. Therefore, with this
choice of base category, the remaining coeﬃcients β1, β2, and β3 measure the change
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relative to the base outcome category with
Pr(Y = i)
Pr(Y = 0)
= eX
′βi , i = {1, 2, 3}.
The matrix of covariates is X = (x1, x2,, . . . , xk) and the value of e
βij can be inter-
preted as the (relative to the base outcome) risk ratio for one unit of change in the
covariate xj. We test the hypothesis of equality of βj coeﬃcients across outcome
categories in order to establish whether there is more voting in both national and
local elections versus voting in national elections only for certain types of voters. 2
The diﬀerential propensity to vote only in national, and not local elections, is tested
using a null hypothesis for the equality of the coeﬃcients in columns (1) and (2) of
tables 3.3 and 3.7.
The diﬀerential overreporting analysis in the NES sample is examined with a
probit model. The dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of overreporting.
It is set to 1 for those respondents who were validated as non-voting but said they
voted and 0 for those who were conﬁrmed as voters and in fact said they voted.
Thus, the denominator used here represents all respondents who claimed they voted
and reﬂects the aggregate amount of misreporting in each type of election. We regress
this measure of vote overreporting on various demographic, geographic variables and
election year indicators.
The probit model is deﬁned as
Pr(yj = 0|xj) = Φ(X ′γ)
2In our study, outcome category Y = 0, the base category, is denoted “NN” and corresponds to
an outcome of no voting in national or local elections, to which all other outcomes are compared.
These include Y = 1, voting in national but not local elections, Y = 2, voting in local but not
national elections and Y = 3 voting at both national and local levels, and are labeled by “YN”,
“NY” and “YY” respectively. The types of voters are deﬁnes as demographic categories according
to age, sex, race, marital status, income, education and a number of social capital variables.
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were Φ is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal distribution, yj
the overreporting indicator outcome, and xj is the vector of covariates for observation
j. We then calculate the marginal eﬀect on the probability of overreporting voting
for an inﬁnitesimal change in a covariate xi as
∂Φ
∂xi
= φ(X¯γ)γi
for continuous covariates and as the diﬀerence in the predicted probabilities at the
means for dichotomous (dummy) variables. We perform hypothesis tests for the
diﬀerences in the eﬀects of the covariates on the probability of overreporting for
presidential versus non presidential year elections.
3.4 Data
This study uses individual level data from the US General Social Survey (GSS),
which is an almost annual “omnibus,” personal interview survey of U.S. households
conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC). The ﬁrst survey took
place in 1972. Beginning in 1973, the General Social Survey was expanded to a
full survey, and National Science Foundation took over the main ﬁnancial support.
Surveys have been conducted annually since 1972 except for the years 1979, 1981,
and 1992 (a supplement was added in 1992), and biennially beginning in 1994. A
repeated cross-section sample of about 1500 U.S. households is surveyed at random
for each of the above years. The content of each survey changes slightly as some items
are added to or deleted from the interview schedule. Main areas covered in the data
include socioeconomic status, social mobility, social control, the family, race relations,
sex relations, civil liberties, and morality. Our version of the data uses the additional
variable of state of residence for the respondent in the year the survey was taken.
In 1987 the GSS Survey asked questions about voter participation which we use
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in our study. Out of the large number of variables included in the U.S. General Social
Survey, we use the answer to the survey questions: “How often does the respondent
vote in local elections?” and “Did the respondent vote in the presidential election in
1980 or in 1984?” This survey data provides information on self reported voting and
it may not be an accurate account of actual voter turnout. However, for the lack of a
complete data set including poll data together with socioeconomic and demographic
variables, the GSS one of the best sources for this type of individual level information
in the US.
Some local elections are held at the same time or at least in the same years as
national elections. Certain states may need to be excluded from the sample in order
to decouple the eﬀects of participation in a national election from participation in
a local one. We include all respondents to the 1987 GSS Survey aged between 30
and 80 years, so that the respondents would have been of voting age in 1980. We
assume that there has been at least one local election in every community between
the national election in 1984 and 1987 when the data was collected. Respondents to
this survey would then have at least one local election in the 3 year period between
1984 and 1987 to refer to when answering the GSS questions. This assumption is
adequate as most communities in the US hold municipal level elections of one sort or
another most years.
While the US has 50 states only ﬁve of them hold state elections in years when no
national election is held. Mississippi, New Jersey, Virginia and Louisiana hold state
gubernatorial and legislative elections in years when no congressional elections are
held, and Kentucky elects a governor in the oﬀ national election years. The 1500 US
households surveyed at random each year since 1972, present too small of a sample if
we are to look only at the above ﬁve states. As a small sample problem is unavoidable
and because of the particular way in which the local elections question in the GSS
is phrased (not to explicitly include state elections), we concentrate on municipal
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vs. national elections here, and include residents of all states and the District of
Columbia.
Because of the self reported nature of the data, a check for possible diﬀerential
misreporting in the two election modes is warranted. In order to investigate the
diﬀerential misreporting of turnout in national versus local level elections in the US
we use data from the American National Election Studies (NES) collected by the
University of Michigan Center for Political Studies. The NES data used here contains
self reported voting turnout, vote validation, and demographics for the November
elections in the years 1978, 1980, 1984, 1986, 1988 and 1990. There are a total of
12,371 observations in our NES data from which we use the respondents aged 30 to 80
years in order to match the demographic characteristics of the respondents in the GSS
data used here 3. The validation of the self reported vote was achieved by checking
voter registration records and voting records of the respondents. Thus, the vote of
respondents who said they voted in the particular election was then attempted to be
validated. No validation attempts were made for the respondents who indicated they
did not vote. The self reported voters were then designated as validated voters, if
there was a record indicating they actually voted, or as validated non-voters, if there
was a record indicating they did not vote. In the event that no records were existing
or no records were found, the respondent was designated as a non-validated voter.
More than 90% of all vote misreports are done by people who did not actually vote,
see [10], page 614. There is little point in investigating the misreporting of those who
said they did not vote, but actually did.
We use the NES sample above to examine two types of elections: the presiden-
tial year elections, characterized by a relatively high turnout, and the midterm year
elections, which have a consistently lower turnout than the presidential year elec-
tions. The self reported turnout in the national versus local level elections from the
3The results of the overreporting analysis performed on the full NES sample do not diﬀer signif-
icantly from the results using those respondents aged 30 to 80 years.
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1987 GSS sample is similar to the self reported turnout in the presidential versus the
midterm election years in the NES sample. We use the diﬀerential overreporting of
voting in presidential versus midterm national elections to proxy for overreporting in
national versus lower level elections.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Examining Diﬀerential Overreporting
The summary statistics for the NES data sample used here are presented in table
3.2. The overall (self reported) turnout in presidential election years is 77.6% and
that in midterm election years is 58.9%. These numbers reﬂect a diﬀerence similar
to the self reported turnout in the national versus local level elections in the GSS
sample used in this study, see table 3.1. This similarity allows us to proxy for the
diﬀerence in overreporting that could exist in national versus local elections with
the diﬀerence we observe in vote overreporting in presidential versus midterm year
elections. The diﬀerences in prestige of the oﬃce and the issues voted on, as well
as the cost-beneﬁt decision that drives the turnout must be similar in the NES and
the GSS data samples. The demographic characteristics for the two samples (for
the respondents aged 30 to 80 years) are quite similar. The mean number years of
education and income are almost exactly the same in the two samples and the amount
of time lived in one’s community corresponds well in the two samples. The race and
sex of the respondents in the two samples is also quite similar. There are more married
respondents in the NES sample by 7%. Yet the total number of children is much lower
in the NES sample. The GSS respondents we use in this study reported an average
of 2.43 children. The NES respondents used here only had .805 children on average.
This discrepancy is possibly due to the interpretation of the survey question as total
number of children vs. total number of children currently living in the household. The
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number of children does not seem to play an important role in misreporting one’s vote,
and more importantly in diﬀerentially misreporting one’s vote in the diﬀerent types
of election. Thus, this diﬀerence between the two data sets is not of great concern for
this study. The respondents in the GSS sample tend to live in larger cities by about
a hundred thousand residents than those surveyed in the NES sample. However, as
the population of the local place of residence enters in logarithms in our speciﬁcation,
the diﬀerence amounts to one base point. The demographic characteristics of the two
samples as well as the voting patterns in the two modes of election in each case allow
us to use the NES data described above to investigate any diﬀerential overreporting
of votes.
Table 3.5 presents the results from the probit analysis of overreporting in the
pooled NES sample from all presidential and midterm election years in our sample.
The results we present here largely agree with the ﬁndings in the literature. Similarly
to the work of B. Silver at. al. [10] we ﬁnd that education increases the probability that
people report they have voted when in fact they have not. An inﬁnitesimal increase in
a respondent’s amount of schooling increases the probability they incorrectly report a
vote by 0.006. Other covariates that increase the probability of such vote misreporting
in the November election for presidential and midterm election years include age
and being married. The eﬀect of age on vote misreporting becomes less signiﬁcant
in the full sample including respondents 18 years and older. Being back actually
decreases the probability of respondents stating they have voted when they have not
in this sample. Results from B. Silver at. al. above indicate that race does not
increase the probability of misreporting, yet the evidence they cite in the literature
is mixed. Here, we ﬁnd that Blacks are actually less likely to overreport voting than
observationally similar Whites. The result seems to be sensitive to the exact deﬁnition
of overreporting of voting as fraction of those who said they voted, as a fraction of
the entire population or as a fraction of those who did not vote.
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The above analysis is an important conﬁrmation of some existing results about
vote overreporting. Yet, in this work we are concerned with the possibility of diﬀeren-
tial overreporting rather than the level of overall misreporting of self-reported votes.
If there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the amount of vote overreporting in high turnout
versus lower turnout elections, the results of this study would be biased. Thus, we di-
vide the NES sample into observations from presidential (high turnout) election years
and midterm election years. We then perform a probit analysis of the probability to
overreport voting and do hypothesis tests for the equality of coeﬃcients across pres-
idential and midterm election years. Table 3.6 presents the results. The dependent
variable is again the fraction of respondents who were validated as non-voters, but
said they voted divided by the total number of respondents who said they voted.
The only covariate for which the null hypothesis of the equality of the coeﬃcients
in the two modes of election rejects is the length lived in the community. We are con-
ﬁdent to the 5% level that the probability to overreport voting in the higher turnout
elections is less than the probability to overreport voting in the lower turnout elec-
tions. This ﬁnding is consistent with the possibility that voters who have lived in
a community for a long time feel obligated to contribute to the community through
voting in the local or lower turnout elections. There may be stigma associated with
long time residency and no participation in the local community including voting in
the local elections. Therefore, these long time residents may be overreporting that
they vote in the local (lower turnout) elections. The long time residents of a commu-
nity are less likely to overreport voting in the presidential (higher turnout) elections
as there is no community speciﬁc stigma for abstaining from voting in presidential
elections.
This said, the diﬀerential eﬀect for the probability to overreport voting is by no
means large. Calculating the marginal eﬀect of length lived in the community on the
probability to misreport voting we ﬁnd an inﬁnitesimal increase in the length lived in
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a community decreases the probability to misreport a vote in the presidential election
years by 0.00016. This change is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The change in
the probability of overreport voting in non-presidential years associated with length
lived in the community is 0.00057. It is signiﬁcant to 5%. An inﬁnitesimal increase
in the length lived in the community increases the probability of misreporting voting
in a lower turnout election by 0.0006. Such a small change is below the signiﬁcance
of our main results and there is no need to correct our results for it.
While we do ﬁnd that there is overreporting of voting correlated with educa-
tion, race, and marital status, the overreporting does not occur diﬀerentially in lower
turnout versus higher turnout elections. If respondents state they voted when in fact
they did not, this occurs with equal probability in higher and lower turnout elections.
Both local and midterm elections have similar turnout levels relative to turnout in
presidential elections in the US. Thus, we can proxy for local elections with midterm
elections for the purposes of examining the potential problem of vote overreporting.
We expect no diﬀerential overreporting problem exists in our data for the covariates
examined above except length lived in a particular community. While we do ﬁnd
a higher probability of those who have lived in one community longer to overreport
voting in lower level elections, the eﬀect is too small to warrant correction for it in
this study. Even though some of the numbers in columns (1), (2), and (3) of the
main result table will be higher because of vote overreporting, the diﬀerence is un-
aﬀected. The results of the propensity to vote in national only versus national and
local elections are not biased by a possible vote misreporting problem. We present
those results conﬁdent that no correction is needed.
3.5.2 Results Involving “Always” Voting
The General Social Survey data used in this study includes self reported voting be-
havior described here as “always” voting in local or national elections. We construct
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voting outcome categories based on self reported always voting and we also calculate
results using those respondents who reported they either always vote or that they
rarely miss voting in local elections, and present them in an appendix. National level
voting is similarly deﬁned as “always” voting if a respondent voted in both 1980 and
1984 presidential elections recorded in the data.
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics of key variables in the 1987 US General
Social Survey used in this study. It is possible that those participants who indicated
that they did not vote in the 1980 US presidential election, or that did not vote in
both the 1980 and the 1984 presidential elections but did indicate that they vote in
local elections may not have been of voting age at the time of the national elections
recorded in the data. Therefore, we concentrate our analysis on respondents who
were 30 years or older in 1987. By restricting ourselves to these respondents, we
eliminate any eﬀects in the patterns of voting behavior due to the voters who have
recently started to vote on account of their age. The mean age of respondents to
the survey we include in this study is 49.8 years. We divide the respondents into
younger (30 years old to 44 years old), middle aged (45 to 59 years old), and senior
individuals (60 to 80 years old). We also exclude the very old respondents, as those
above 80 years old are more likely to be mentally or physically incapacitated to vote.
There are 43.7% of younger voters, 27.4% of middle aged voters and 28.9% of senior
voters in our sample. Out of those aged 30 and over voters, 79% voted in the 1980
national election, and 75% replied they voted in the 1984 national election. A slightly
higher, 75.7%, of the respondents to this survey indicated that they either always vote
or that they sometimes miss voting in local elections. That number falls to 39.9%
among those who indicated they always vote in local elections.
The mean amount of schooling in our sample is 12.2 years, with 31.4% of respon-
dents holding a High School degree as the highest level of education attained, 30.4%
have at most some college education, and only 9.5% hold a college degree or have
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more than college education. The respondent’s income is reported in 12 categories,
and the mean income at 9.95 falls between $10,000 and $15,000 per year in 1987 dol-
lars. The mean number of children is 2.43, and 56.3% of the respondents are married.
Only 5.78% have lived in their particular community for less than a year at the time
of the interview, 12.4% have lived there between one and three years, 17.6% of the
respondents have lived in their community 4 to 10 years, the majority, 46.2% have
lived in their current community for more than 10 years, and only 18.1% indicate they
lived their entire life in their particular community. Homeowners make up 68.9% of
the observations used. Of our sample, 57.6% are female and 11.8% are Black. We
weigh our observations appropriately to account for the oversampling of Blacks in the
GSS.
Table 3.3 presents the likelihood, in logarithmic terms, of a respondent to always
vote in one of three diﬀerent modes relative to the baseline mode of not voting in
either national or local elections. The results presented in the main body of this work
include state indicator variable to account for possible diﬀerences in state speciﬁc
election and voter registration laws. Diﬀerences in the results with and without
the state ﬁxed eﬀects are discussed in the appendix. In most of the demographic
categories explored here, there is a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between those
who choose not to vote in either type of election and those who always vote in both
modes. Higher income, more educated and Black respondents are more likely to
always vote in both national and local elections than not at all. Older individuals are
also more likely to vote in both elections than not at all, except for the very old, aged
60 to 80, in our data, who are less likely to vote in both election types than not vote
at all. These results are to be expected as they are consistent with general voting
behavior observed in the US. 4
4In a probit model analysis using the GSS data sample used here, we ﬁnd probabilities of voting
in national elections that are similar and consistent with the ﬁndings presented in Wolﬁnger and
Rosenstone [9] for the variables available in both data sets.
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The larger the community size, the less likely the respondents are to always vote
in any elections than not vote, which is consistent with an interpretation of a free
riding of voters eﬀect in large cities. The larger the community, the smaller the share
of civic duty that falls on each member of that community. Thus, many potential
voters avoid the costs and responsibilities associated with voting in larger communi-
ties where that responsibility is shared among a larger number of potential voters.
Homeownership increases the likelihood of voting in all types of elections, and so does
the length a respondent has lived in the same community, independently of the size
of the community. Homeownership and the length lived in the community must act
to strengthen the civic duty, and increase not only the community speciﬁc social cap-
ital, see [4], but build an overall social and civic awareness, which at least in terms of
voting, carries beyond the particular community the respondent is associated with.
Number of children, marital status and sex seem to have less of an impact on the
decision to vote in all levels of election as opposed to not voting at all. Column (3)
in table 3.3 represents a small an somewhat unusual mode of voting behavior. The
respondents in this group indicated that they always vote in local elections but do not
always vote in national ones. Theories of voting behavior dictate that as the stakes
are higher in national elections, in aspects ranging from the amounts of money to be
allocated, to the prestige of the oﬃce for which one is voting, considering the costs
associated with voting, if a voter decides to vote in a lower level election, then this
voter should vote in the national level election as well. However, we do see a small
number of respondents who only vote in local level elections relative to not voting at
all. Since we have limited our investigation to those of voting age during the national
elections in 1980 and 1984 these respondents might include newly naturalized citizens
since 1984 who had recently become eligible to vote. We leave considerations about
the nature of voting in local elections only and not vote in national elections aside
for the purposes of the current investigation. The diﬀerences between the group of
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respondents who indicated that they vote in all levels of elections, and those that
indicated they vote only nationally are the main focus of this study.
Table 3.3 shows more educated respondents are less likely to vote in national
elections only than to vote in both levels of election relative to not voting at all.
This may be due to lower costs of voting at a local level for more educated voters,
prompting more educated voters to be more willing to vote at both levels of election
if they choose to vote at all. More educated voters may also recognize that their local
vote aﬀects them more directly than their vote at the national level 5 In the case of the
eﬀect of education on diﬀerential propensities to vote at local or national levels, the
relative risk ratio between voting in both levels and voting only nationally is 1.076, so
one extra year of education makes a voter almost 8% more likely to (report) vote in
both types of election than in national elections only. The relative risk ratios and the
corresponding marginal eﬀects for the voter characteristics with signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the two modes of election examined here are presented in table 3.4. Higher
levels of education could be associated with higher levels of civic duty at a local level,
where a more educated voter plays a larger role in the community. At the same time,
higher education implies lower costs of voting at the local level, in terms of ﬁnding
information about the candidates and issues at stake, and in terms of interpreting
the available information. Since information about the issues and candidates in a
national election is more widely publicized and analyzed, it is easier for voters with
less education to learn and understand their voting choices in national elections.
In smaller communities, respondents are more likely to vote locally and nationally
rather than only nationally by about 3% for every approximately 2700 fewer residents.
The length lived in the same community increases substantially the propensity to vote
5We ﬁnd overreporting to be positively correlated with the voter’s level of education and married
status. While the overall numbers pertaining to the importance of education for voter turnout we
report may be overstated by as a result, see [10] and the previous section of this study, we ﬁnd no
evidence that there is diﬀerential overreporting of turnout in national vs. local level elections in the
US. Therefore the diﬀerential propensities to vote in the two modes of election should be unaﬀected
by the potential problem of overreporting due to the respondent’s educational level.
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in both types of election rather than to vote in national elections only. This eﬀect is
quite strong, and while the nature of the deﬁnition of length lived in the community in
the GSS makes it harder to interpret the magnitude of the risk ratio here, it is about
1.38 as we move from less than 1 year, to 1 – 3 years, to 4 – 10 years, to more than 10
years, to entire life spent in the particular community. This on average translates to
36% more likely to vote in national and local elections as opposed to national elections
only as we move from category to category. This eﬀect points to a possibility that
the costs associated with voting locally fall drastically as a voter acquires community
speciﬁc information. The beneﬁts of voting locally are also expected to increase as one
accumulates time lived in a particular community. On one hand, perhaps the longer
a voter lives in a community, the longer this voter expects to stay which prompts him
or her to vote locally in addition to nationally in order to secure future ﬁscal and
other beneﬁt allocation to oneself. On the other hand, voting locally in addition to
nationally will help voters promote and keep high the value of local capital such as
real estate they hold.
If the latter is the incentive which causes long time local residents to vote in
their local communities in addition to voting nationally, we would expect of ﬁnd
homeowners voting at higher rates nationally and locally rather than nationally only.
However, in our data we ﬁnd only a small diﬀerence between the rates at which
homeowners vote nationally only versus voting nationally and locally. Thus, the
homeowners in our sample are not predisposed to vote at diﬀerent rates in the two
modes of voting behavior explored here. Monetary incentives, such as property taxes
are not driving the decision to vote locally. Perhaps homeowners are less concerned
with the particular level of of taxation as long as the taxes are spent in agreement
with their preferences for local amenities. The number of children6 the respondent has
6The results were also calculated using a variable indicating the respondent has any children, as
opposed to number of children, which did not aﬀect the respondent’s propensity to vote diﬀerently
in the two levels of election in the always voting category or in the usually voting category.
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does not signiﬁcantly alter the respondent’s propensity to vote locally and nationally
versus voting only nationally. However, there is no indication in our data whether the
respondent’s children live with the respondent, or whether they attend local public
schools, so it is diﬃcult to assess the impact of preference for school provision on
voting behavior here.
Age increases the propensity to vote both nationally and locally as opposed to
nationally only. A respondent who is one year older than another is 5% more likely
to vote locally as well as nationally rather than nationally only. This result could
be picking up social capital in terms of one’s sense of belonging to a particular com-
munity through age. This eﬀect is diﬀerent than the length lived in a community
eﬀect discussed above since we have controlled for the length lived in the particular
community. That is, as life progresses, voters may be able to more accurately asses
or experience the beneﬁts of voting for local amenities, which prompts them to vote
locally as well as nationally. Age groups of younger, middle aged and senior voters,
however, do not show signiﬁcant diﬀerential propensities of voting, and neither do
the 60 – 80 year old voters. In the seniors (60 – 80 year old) voters we see a lower
probability of voting in any election mode explored rather than not voting at all.
The seniors in this study are less likely to vote in national and local elections than
to vote nationally only, but the diﬀerence in the voting rates is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant. Theories of voting behavior predict that seniors may be largely interested
in Social Security allocations which are determined at the national level in the US,
and thus they would vote nationally only. In her work, A. Campbell [2] ﬁnds that
senior citizens’ participation in the political process in indeed inﬂuenced by Social
Security allocations. Her ﬁndings are driven largely by political participation modes
such as monetary contributions, contacting politicians and volunteering for political
campaigns as well as voting. However, as far as voting is concerned, we do not ﬁnd
a diﬀerential propensity in our data for senior citizens voting at national levels only.
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Thus, we conclude that while the senior citizen’s decision to vote may include consid-
erations about Social Security, it is not inﬂuenced by Social Security disbursements
only. When senior citizens decide to vote, this decision is most likely based on civic
duty and lower costs of voting due to the senior citizens’ high levels of free time rather
than simply personal monetary gain involving Social Security allocations. Of course,
the poorest of the senior voters would be most aﬀected by Social Security policy,
but we do not ﬁnd that an income and age interaction, or and income and senior
aged indicator variable interaction has any eﬀect on the diﬀerential voting behavior
in the GSS data employed in this study. Income itself has no eﬀect on the diﬀeren-
tial propensity to vote nationally only versus voting nationally and locally. Marital
status, sex, and race have little to do with the respondent’s decision to vote at the
national and local versus voting at the national only level as well.
Overall, we ﬁnd that homeownership does not change the propensity to vote in
national and local elections, as opposed to national elections only in both always and
usual voting behavior. Therefore we conclude that this diﬀerential voting decision
must be based on social capital and non-monetary incentives rather than the interest
a voter has in the local real estate he or she holds in a community. This non-monetary
channel through which voters decide to participate in elections is reinforced with the
results we ﬁnd about the senior voters decision to participate in local elections at
very similar rates to the rates this age group votes in national elections only. The
seniors, and more importantly the poor seniors’ decision to vote is not just inﬂuenced
by Social Security issues. The voters’ decision to participate in the electoral process
at a local level though voting is driven by social capital rather than monetary capital.
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3.6 Conclusion
Voting is an important mode of civic participation in the US. Voting participation
studies have established that US citizen vote in local level elections at consistently
lower rates that they do in national level elections. In this study, we have addressed
the question concerning what type of voters are the ones who vote in nationally only
and do not vote locally as opposed to the voters who turn out to vote in both levels
of election. Considering the costs and beneﬁts from political participation through
voting, we expect that if voters decide to vote, they would do so in national level
elections at least, as national level elections involve the allocation of larger amounts
of money than are at stake in municipal level elections and also because more prestige
is associated with national elections. Some voters would then decide to vote in local
level elections in addition to voting at the national level. Voters are expected in
theory to vote in local elections in addition to voting in national elections when their
connections with the local community are strong. On the voting cost side, voters
who decide to vote at all are expected to vote at the national level at least, since
information about national elections is more readily available, and some voters would
also vote at the local level, when it is easier for them to acquire information about
the choices in the local election.
We ﬁnd that education plays a central role in the voters’ decision to vote in local
elections as well as to vote in national ones. More education decreases the costs of
voting locally. More time spent as a resident of a particular community also decreases
the cost of voting in this community through the ease of acquiring information about
the choices to be voted on, and it also increases the beneﬁts from voting locally. Thus,
voters who have lived in their respective communities longer, vote locally as well as
nationally at much higher rates than they vote nationally only. Age also increases
the this diﬀerential voting propensity toward voting locally as well as nationally.
Demographic characteristics such as income, sex, race, marital status and number
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of children explored in this study do not play a role in the voters’ decision to vote
nationally only versus voting nationally and locally.
DiPasquale and Glaeser [4] ﬁnd in their work that homeowners are better citizen,
as they participate in social and civic life at higher rates than renters do. Here,
we reﬁne the considerations of homeownership in issues of civic participation as we
ﬁnd that homeowners, while they may be better citizen in general, are not better
local voting participants. Homeowners do not contribute to voter turnout locally
diﬀerently than other residents of the community contribute. The decision to vote
locally is not based on monetary self interest and local capital incentives such as
property taxes and real estate values. Instead, it is based on the amount of social
capital and non-monetary connections one has in the local community, including
length lived in the community, education — a proxy for local community standing and
civic duty, and to some extent age — again implying a civic and local responsibility
to participate in the local political process as a member of the community. This
non-ﬁscal channel for the incentives for local voting participation is reinforced in our
results through our ﬁndings that elderly, and poorer elderly voters do not tend to
vote nationally only. National level decisions about Social Security distributions do
not seem to play into this group of voters’ decision to vote diﬀerently in the two types
of elections. Therefore, they must not be considering their own ﬁscal beneﬁt in their
diﬀerential voting decision. Education and length lived in the community also aﬀect
this diﬀerential voting decision as higher levels of these voter characteristics act to
reduce the costs of voting through the ease of gathering and processing information
about the local election in question.
Given the results of this study, we conclude that social capital and civic duty and
responsibility together with informational attainment cost of voting drive the decision
of voters in the US to vote nationally and locally as opposed to nationally only. The
reason why voters turn out to vote does not seem to be governed by personal ﬁscal
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gains and redistributions to the voters but rather by non-monetary reasons. These
reasons include the citizens’ responsibility to participate in the voting process when
the costs of voting are suﬃciently low. If the beneﬁts from voting play into the
decision to vote, our results imply that they must work through the willingness of the
voter to pay higher property taxes and allow the government to have funds, as long
as the funds are spent on locally and nationally allocated amenities that agree with
the particular voter’s preferences over these amenities. Thus, the decision to turn out
to vote would not be inﬂuenced by the government’s propositions to raise funds but
the voter would turn out to vote in the appropriate election in order to express his
or her preferences on how the funds should be spent.
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Table 3.1: Means and Percentages of Key Variables From the GSS Sample
Mean Percent N
1. Age (30 to 80) 49.8 — 1321
Aged 30 to 44 — 43.7 577
Aged 45 to 59 — 27.4 362
Aged 60 to 80 — 28.9 382
2. Years of Schooling 12.2 — 1316
Less than High School — 28.8 380
High School — 31.4 415
(Some) College — 30.4 401
More than College — 9.46 125
3. Mean Income Category 9.95 — 1317
4. Number of Children 2.43 — 1317
Has any children — 81.9 1317
5. Length Lived in Community 3.58 — 1316
Less that 1 year — 5.78 76
1 to 3 years — 12.4 163
4 to 10 years — 17.6 231
More that 10, less than life — 46.2 608
Entire life — 18.1 238
6. Population of Community in 1000s 425.9 — 1321
7. Female — 57.6 761
8. Married — 56.3 744
9. Black — 11.8 158
10. Homeowner — 68.9 910
14. Voted in 1980 National Election — 79.0 1005
15. Voted in 1984 National Election — 75.0 961
16. Always Votes in Local Elections — 39.9 522
17. Usually Votes in Local Elections — 75.7 991
Note: Income categories: 1 - Under $1,000, 2 - $1,000 to 2,999, 3 - $3,000 to 3,9 99, 4 - $4,000 to
4,999, 5 - $5,000 to 5,999, 6 - $6,000 to 6,999, 7 - $7,000 to 7,999, 8 - $8,000 to 9,999, 9 - $10,000
to 14,999, 10 - $15,000 to 19,999, 11 - $20,000 to 24,999, 12 - $25,000 or over. Length lived in
community: 1 - Less than one year, 2 - One to three years, 3 - Four to ten years, 4 - More than ten
years, but not entire life, 5 - Entire life. The sample excludes respondents less than 30 years old and
those more than 80 years old.
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Table 3.2: Means and Percentages of Key Variables From the NES Sample for Over-
reporting Analysis
Mean Percent N
1. Age (30 to 80) 49.9 — 8926
Aged 30 to 44 — 44.2 3946
Aged 45 to 59 — 26.7 2386
Aged 60 to 80 — 29.1 2594
2. Years of Schooling 12.3 — 8885
Less than High School — 25.9 2304
High School — 34.4 3058
(Some) College — 29.1 2586
More than College — 10.6 937
3. Mean Income Category 9.31 — 6946
4. Number of Children .805 — 8916
Has any children — 39.9 3559
5. Length Lived in Community (in years) 32.3 — 8886
Less that 6 months — 2.50 222
6 mo. to 3 years — 6.60 587
3 to 10 years — 22.4 1989
More that 10, less than life — 49.4 4387
Entire life — 17.3 1534
6. Population of Community in 1000s 290 — 8926
7. Female — 55.9 8926
8. Married — 63.3 8898
9. Black — 11.8 8890
10. Homeowner — 73.5 8873
11. Turnout in Presidential Year Elections — 77.6 3791
12. Turnout in Midterm Year Elections — 58.9 4623
Note: Income categories: 01. none or less than $2,999, 02. $3,000 - $4,999, 03. $5,000 - $6,999,
04. $7,000 - $8,999, 05. $9,000 - $9,999, 06. $10,000 - $10,999, 07. $11,000 - $11,999, 08. $12,000 -
$12,999, 09. $13,000 - $13,999, 10. $14,000 - $14,999, 11. $15,000 - $16,999, 12. $17,000 - $19,999,
13. $20,000 - $21,999, 14. $22,000 - $24,999, 15. $25,000 - $29,999, 16. $30,000 - $34,999, 17.
$35,000 - $39,999, 18. $40,000 - $44,999, 19. $45,000 - $49,999, 20. $50,000 - $59,999, 21. $60,000 -
$74,999, 22. $75,000 and over. Turnout is self reported.
115
Table 3.3: Multinomial Logit Regression for the Propensity to (Always) Vote in
National and/or Local Elections
Hypothesis Test of
Cell Coeﬃcients Y N − Y Y = 0
Y Y Y N NY Chi2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Female 0.177 0.465 0.284 3.34
(0.178) (0.178) (0.501)
2. Married -0.042 -0.147 0.493 0.30
(0.219) (0.215) (0.615)
3. Black 0.509 0.345 -0.047 0.34
(0.310) (0.303) (.812)
4. Income 0.151 0.139 0.007 0.07
(0.042) (0.042) (0.111)
5. Years of Schooling 0.264 0.190 0.126 6.23
(0.034) (.034) (0.090)
6. Log of Community Population in 1000s -0.093 -0.062 -0.080 0.52
(0.049) (0.048) (0.128)
7. Length Lived in Community 0.362 0.053 0.022 14.6
(0.089) (0.084) (0.224)
8. Homeownership 0.671 0.436 -0.386 1.11
(0.230) (0.223) (0.593)
9. Number of Children 0.180 0.104 -0.282 0.13
(0.239) (0.234) (0.641)
10. Age 0.065 0.016 -0.029 8.78
(0.019) (0.020) (0.056)
11. Age groups 0.282 0.685 0.993 1.75
(0.354) (0.357) (0.990)
12. Aged 60 to 80 -0.261 -0.300 -0.058 0.01
(0.421) (0.428) (1.141)
Note: N = 1176. Standard errors shown in parentheses, (.) indicates signiﬁcance in columns (1),
(2), and (3) and rejection of the hypothesis in column (4) to the 5% level. YY - the respondent
votes in national and local elections, YN - the respondent votes in national but not local elections,
NY - the respondent votes in local but not national elections, NN - the respondent does not vote in
either election type. NN is the comparison category. Respondents ineligible to vote in either 1980
or 1984 national election are excluded. The sample excludes respondents less than 30 years old and
those more than 80 years old. State ﬁxed eﬀects included in the analysis.
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Table 3.4: Relative Risk Ratios and Marginal Eﬀects for Voting in Both Modes of
Election versus Voting Nationally Only.
Relative Risk Marginal Propensity to
Ratio of Vote in
YY vs. YN Both Levels National Only
(1) (2) (3)
1. Female 0.749 — 25%
2. Years of Schooling 1.076 7.6% —
3. Length Lived in Community (Ranges) 1.362 36.2% —
4. Age 1.050 5.0% —
Note: Relative risk ratios for the propensity to vote in national and local elections as opposed to
voting nationally only for a unit increase, or one category to the next increase where appropriate,
in the respective covariate.
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Table 3.5: Probability of Vote Overreporting for the Pooled NES Data
Coeﬃcient Marginal Eﬀect
(1) (2)
1. Years of Schooling 0.033 0.006
(0.011) (0.002)
2. Male -0.106 -0.019
(0.063) (0.011)
3. Black -0.479 -0.110
(0.084) (0.023)
4. Married 0.336 0.065
(0.066) (0.013)
5. Log of Community Size 0.0003 0.00005)
(0.012) (0.00216)
6. Length Lived in Community 0.0009 0.00015)
(0.0009) (0.00016)
7. Income Category -0.003 -0.00056
(0.005) (0.00100)
8. Homeowner 0.082 0.016
(0.069) (0.014)
9. Number of Children 0.023 0.004
(0.028) (0.005)
10. Age 0.037 0.006
(0.016) (0.003)
11. Age Squared -0.0002 -0.000045
(0.0002) (0.000028)
12. Aged 60 to 80 -0.040 -0.008
(0.086) (0.017)
Note: N = 3984. Standard errors shown in parentheses, (.) indicates signiﬁcance to the 5% level.
Marginal eﬀects for the change in probability to overreport voting for inﬁnitesimal change in the
continuous covariates and for change from 0 to 1 in the indicator (dummy) variables at the mean
(0.887) Results for the 30 to 80 years old respondents. Year and state speciﬁc eﬀects included, state
eﬀects not signiﬁcant.
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Table 3.6: Diﬀerential Probability to Overreport Voting in Presidential (High
Turnout) versus Midterm (Lower Turnout) Elections
Coeﬃcients in Election Years Hypothesis Test of
Presidential Midterm P −NP = 0
P NP Chi2
(1) (2) (3)
1. Years of Schooling 0.017 0.054 2.87
(0.015) (0.016)
2. Male -0.097 -0.107 0.01
(0.086) (0.093)
3. Black -0.447 -0.510 0.14
(0.118) (0.122)
4. Married 0.369 0.273 0.51
(0.087) (0.104)
5. Log of Community Size -0.003 0.001 0.03
(0.017) (0.016)
6. Length Lived in Community -0.00087 0.00306 4.53
(0.00124) (0.00137)
7. Income Category 0.003 -0.009 1.25
(0.008) (0.008)
8. Homeowner 0.019 0.178 1.29
(0.095) (0.103)
9. Number of Children 0.049 0.002 0.67
(0.040) (0.040)
10. Age 0.031 0.048 0.29
(0.023) (0.023)
11. Age Squared -0.0002 -0.0003 0.24
(0.0002) (0.0002)
12. Aged 60 to 80 -0.092 0.227 1.63
(0.176) (0.177)
Note: N = 3984. Standard errors shown in parentheses, (.) indicates signiﬁcance in columns (1)
and (2) and rejection of the hypothesis in column (3) to the 5% level.
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Appendix A
Results Involving Usual Voting
We present the results analogous to the main result (Table3.3) of this study cal-
culated using the less restrictive deﬁnition of voting participation.
Table 3.7: Multinomial Logit Regression for the Propensity to Usually Vote in Na-
tional and/or Local Elections
Hypothesis Test of
Cell Coeﬃcients Y N − Y Y = 0
Y Y Y N NY Chi2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Female 0.256 0.307 -0.078 0.05
(0.201) (0.275) (0.500)
2. Married -0.405 -0.075 -1.15 1.42
(0.246) (0.331) (0.566)
3. Black 0.585 0.886 0.361 0.61
(0.349) (0.465) (.753)
4. Income 0.116 -0.024 -0.51 7.87
(0.044) (0.057) (0.094)
5. Years of Schooling 0.251 0.149 0.085 5.88
(0.038) (.051) (0.089)
6. Log of Community Population in 1000s -0.070 0.013 0.006 1.87
(0.053) (0.073) (0.132)
7. Length Lived in Community 0.122 -0.178 -0.092 8.41
(0.098) (0.124) (0.212)
8. Homeownership 0.812 0.706 0.058 0.13
(0.224) (0.340) (0.564)
9. Number of Children 0.633 0.852 0.467 0.49
(0.263) (0.373) (0.639)
10. Age 0.045 0.003 -0.044 3.08
(0.021) (0.029) (0.055)
11. Age groups 0.088 0.074 0.596 0.00
(0.406) (0.551) (0.998)
12. Aged 60 to 80 -0.118 0.165 -0.137 0.27
(0.486) (0.674) (1.226)
Note: N = 1176. Standard errors shown in parentheses, (.) indicates signiﬁcance in columns (1),
(2), and (3) and rejection of the hypothesis in column (4) to the 5% level. YY - the respondent
votes in national and local elections, YN - the respondent votes in national but not local elections,
NY - the respondent votes in local but not national elections, NN - the respondent does not vote in
either election type. NN is the comparison category. Respondents ineligible to vote in either 1980
or 1984 national election are excluded. The sample excludes respondents less than 30 years old and
those more than 80 years old. State ﬁxed eﬀects included in the analysis.
We deﬁne “usually” voting to include those who report that they always vote in
local elections, and those who reported they rarely miss voting. In the national level
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elections, the respondent is “usually” voting if the respondent voted in at least one
of the 1980 or 1984 elections recorded here.
The results using the less strict deﬁnition of usual voting, presented in table 3.7
show a similar situation to the one presented in the main body of this article. The
signiﬁcance of the results is reduced because of this more inclusive deﬁnition of voting,
as is to be expected. The diﬀerence in the age coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant only ot 8%
here. The only notable diﬀerence with the results calculated with our deﬁnition of
always voting, comes when we consider the eﬀect of income. In table 3.7 it appears
that the eﬀect of income on the respondent’s propensity to vote in the two types of
elections is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. As income increases a respondent is less likely to
vote in national elections only. However, both relevant coeﬃcients are very close to
zero, implying very small propensity to vote in either mode as opposed to not vote
at all based on income, so we do not consider income to be a very important channel
for the diﬀerential voting behavior explored here.
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Appendix B
Results Excluding State Fixed Eﬀects
Results including state ﬁxed eﬀects shown in tables 3.3 and 3.7 are similar to the
ones with no state-speciﬁc indicator variables presented here.
Table 3.8: Multinomial Logit Regression for the Propensity to (Always) Vote in
National and/or Local Elections (No State Speciﬁc Eﬀects)
Hypothesis Test of
Cell Coeﬃcients Y N − Y Y = 0
Y Y Y N NY Chi2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Female 0.221 0.444 0.348 2.29
(0.167) (0.168) (0.461)
2. Married 0.059 -0.128 0.309 0.84
(0.205) (0.203) (0.561)
3. Black 0.638 0.371 0.489 1.13
(0.277) (0.274) (.688)
4. Income 0.122 0.122 0.022 0.00
(0.039) (0.039) (0.096)
5. Years of Schooling 0.274 0.191 0.340 8.76
(0.032) (.033) (0.087)
6. Log of Community Population in 1000s -0.124 -0.039 -0.176 5.60
(0.040) (0.039) (0.113)
7. Length Lived in Community 0.339 0.014 0.057 19.2
(0.081) (0.077) (0.202)
8. Homeownership 0.632 0.548 -0.307 0.17
(0.213) (0.206) (0.548)
9. Number of Children 0.015 -0.050 -0.088 2.14
(0.049) (0.051) (0.128)
10. Age 0.058 0.015 -0.047 7.43
(0.018) (0.018) (0.052)
11. Age groups 0.394 0.691 1.389 1.08
(0.333) (0.337) (0.927)
12. Aged 60 to 80 -0.346 -0.273 -0.392 0.05
(0.401) (0.410) (1.052)
Note: N = 1176. Standard errors shown in parentheses, (.) indicates signiﬁcance in columns (1),
(2), and (3) and rejection of the hypothesis in column (4) to the 5% level. YY - the respondent
votes in national and local elections, YN - the respondent votes in national but not local elections,
NY - the respondent votes in local but not national elections, NN - the respondent does not vote in
either election type. NN is the comparison category. Respondents ineligible to vote in either 1980
or 1984 national election are excluded. The sample excludes respondents less than 30 years old and
those more than 80 years old.
The only signiﬁcantly diﬀerent result appears in the diﬀerential propensity to vote
in the two election modes due to community size. The diﬀerences in the propensity to
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vote locally and nationally as opposed to the propensity to vote in national elections
only due to community size are no longer statistically signiﬁcant when state ﬁxed
eﬀects for the 39 most populous states in our sample are included in the analysis.
Table 3.9: Multinomial Logit Regression for the Propensity to Usually Vote in Na-
tional and/or Local Elections (No State Speciﬁc Eﬀects)
Hypothesis Test of
Cell Coeﬃcients Y N − Y Y = 0
Y Y Y N NY Chi2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Female 0.287 0.351 -0.037 0.09
(0.190) (0.260) (0.457)
2. Married -0.280 -0.003 -0.974 1.16
(0.230) (0.312) (0.546)
3. Black 0.643 0.452 0.225 0.33
(0.310) (0.405) (.649)
4. Income 0.090 -0.025 -0.074 6.16
(0.040) (0.053) (0.079)
5. Years of Schooling 0.264 0.163 0.018 6.19
(0.036) (.049) (0.085)
6. Log of Community Population in 1000s -0.093 0.038 -0.093 6.91
(0.043) (0.059) (0.102)
7. Length Lived in Community 0.093 0.014 -0.057 12.8
(0.087) (0.077) (0.190)
8. Homeownership 0.889 0.849 0.062 0.02
(0.225) (0.313) (0.521)
9. Number of Children 0.475 0.076 0.015 0.20
(0.055) (0.077) (0.129)
10. Age 0.046 0.015 -0.052 2.42
(0.021) (0.018) (0.052)
11. Age groups 0.118 -0.052 0.937 0.16
(0.384) (0.527) (0.958)
12. Aged 60 to 80 -0.220 0.181 -0.727 0.59
(0.468) (0.653) (1.121)
Note: Standard errors shown in parentheses, (.) indicates signiﬁcance in columns (1), (2), and (3)
and rejection of the hypothesis in column (4) to the 5% level. YY - the respondent usually votes in
national and local elections, YN - the respondent usually votes in national but not local elections,
NY - the respondent usually votes in local but not national elections, NN - the respondent does not
usually vote in either election type. NN is the comparison category. Respondents ineligible to vote
in either 1980 or 1984 national election are excluded. The sample excludes respondents less than 30
years old and those more than 80 years old.
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